Notes on a Terrorism Trial – Preventive Prosecution, “Material Support” and The Role of The Judge after United States v. Mehanna by Brown, George D.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-2013
Notes on a Terrorism Trial – Preventive
Prosecution, “Material Support” and The Role of
The Judge after United States v. Mehanna
George D. Brown
Boston College Law School, browngd@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
George D. Brown. "Notes on a Terrorism Trial – Preventive Prosecution, “Material Support” and The Role of The Judge after United
States v. Mehanna." Harvard National Security Journal 4, no.1 (2013): 1-57.
Copyright © 2012 by the Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College and George Brown.	  
ARTICLE 
 
Notes on a Terrorism Trial – Preventive Prosecution, 
“Material Support” and The Role of The Judge after 
United States v. Mehanna 
 
__________________________ 




The terrorism trial of Tarek Mehanna, primarily for charges of providing 
“material support” to terrorism, presented elements of a preventive 
prosecution as well as the problem of applying Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project (HLP) to terrorism-related speech. This Article examines both aspects 
of the case, with emphasis on the central role of the trial judge. As criminal 
activity becomes more amorphous, the jury looks to the judge for guidance. 
His rulings on potentially prejudicial evidence—which may show just how 
much of a “terrorist” the defendant is—are the key aspect of this guidance. 
If the defendant is found guilty, the sentence imposed by the judge can have 
a profound impact on future preventive prosecutions, particularly the 
judge’s handling of the Sentencing Guidelines’ “Terrorism Enhancement.” 
 
As for speech issues, there is enough ambiguity in HLP to let lower courts 
formulate and apply its test differently. HLP emphasizes coordination with a 
foreign terrorist organization before speech can be criminalized. There is 
now movement toward a concept of one-way coordination that can turn 
speech prosecutions into a form of general prevention of potential terrorists.  
 
All of these issues were central to the trial of Mehanna. The Article’s 
analysis of how the trial court handled the various sentencing and speech 
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Introduction: The Concept of Preventive Prosecution 
 
 As Jack Goldsmith demonstrates convincingly in his recent book, 
“Power and Constraint,”1 there is a remarkable degree of continuity 
between the anti-terrorism policies of the Bush administration and that of its 
successor.2 Much to the chagrin of many of his supporters, President 
Obama has built on the efforts and policies of President Bush, regardless of 
what the former may have said during the 2008 campaign.3 The headline-
grabbing stories tell of such marquee programs as drone strikes and cyber-
warfare.4 This Article deals with another, less publicized but equally 
integral, aspect of the war on terrorism: the tactic of preventive prosecution 
of potential terrorists, with principal reliance on the criminal statutes 
forbidding the provision of “material support” to terrorists and terrorist 
organizations.5 According to then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, 
“[p]revention is the goal of all goals when it comes to terrorism because we 
simply cannot and will not wait for these particular crimes to occur before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*Robert F. Drinan, S.J. Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., Harvard 
University, 1961; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1965. The author would like to thank 
Research Assistant Brian Reilly and Mary Ann Neary of the Boston College Law School 
Library for their invaluable help. Professor Peter Margulies contributed valuable insights on 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
 A note on chronology is in order. This Article was completed on August 6, 2012, 
subject to minor editorial changes. An earlier version was presented at a Boston College 
Law School Faculty Colloquium on June 27, 2012. This Article was completed and edited 
prior to the availability of any appellate material. This facilitated my desire to focus on the 
trial phase of the Mehanna case, and also to underscore the fact that the framework and 
themes of this Article are largely my own. This Article draws extensively on the pioneering 
work of Professors Chesney and Margulies. 
1 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 
9/11 (2012). 
2 Id. at 3–22. Professor Goldsmith is remarkably gentle in his treatment of Dean Harold 
Koh’s Pauline conversion on issues of national security. See id. at 20–22. The issue of similar 
policies is also treated in DEAN REUTER & JOHN YOO, CONFRONTING TERROR 9/11 AND 
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY (2011). 
3 See Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
4 David E. Sanger, Obama Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-
cyberattacks-against-iran.html; Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of 
Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-
qaeda.html. 
5 Most importantly, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. III 2009); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Supp. III 
2009). Forms of support can include service, personnel, safe-houses, and financial services. 
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taking action.”6 The Obama administration does not claim to have adopted 
Bush-era policies, but when it comes to preventive prosecution, the 
difference is hard to find.  
 
 Relying primarily on 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B—two statutes 
criminalizing “material support” to terrorists and terrorist organizations7—
the government has moved further and further back in the chain of conduct 
to punish defendants. The criminal law has long recognized inchoate crimes 
such as conspiracy and attempt.8 Indeed, the material support offenses build 
on these very concepts.9 The principal critique of preventive prosecution in 
the terrorism context is that it sometimes reaches beyond potential acts to 
identify and incapacitate the persons who might commit them.10 Such 
prosecutions necessarily rely on a spectrum of prohibited conduct; the 
problem is that the defendants found at one end of this spectrum will not 
have done all that much. Consequently, the “conduct” for which they are 
convicted risks becoming a form of status crime.11 Moreover, the 
prosecution will typically seek to prove this criminal status by highlighting 
an individual defendant’s associations and beliefs. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
preventive prosecution has triggered a wave of First Amendment concerns 
and accusations of a new “McCarthyism.”12 Arab Americans and Muslim 
Americans, in particular, feel that they are being singled out because of their 
religion and political beliefs.13   
 
 As our legal system continues to feel its way through the “war on 
terror,” each new answer seems only to generate a host of additional 
questions. This Article addresses three such questions not widely discussed 
in the literature through the lens of a particular trial: the 2011 prosecution 
of Tarek Mehanna for providing “material support” to terrorists and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Quoted in Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of 
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 425 (2007). Professor Chesney discusses § 
2339A as an example of a statute with preventive capacity. Id. at 480.  
7 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. III 2009); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Supp. III 2009). 
8 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBST. CRIM. L. §§ 11.5, 12.1 (2d ed. 2011).  
9 See generally Chesney, supra note 6. 
10 See id. at 446–47. 
11See generally LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 3.5. 
12 Robert Batey, The Vagueness Doctrine in the Roberts Court: Constitutional Orphan, 80 UMKC L. 
REV. 113, 120, 133 (2011) (discussing status crimes). 
13 See Laura Rovner & Jeanne Theoharis, Preferring Order to Justice, 61 AM. U. L. Rev. 1331, 
1396 (2012) (positing that preventive prosecution has a “chilling effect on . . . Islamic 
political speech and association”). 
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terrorist organizations, and for other related crimes.14 Rather than looking 
backward through the perspective of appellate decisions, this Article 
presents the major legal questions common to preventive prosecutions of 
alleged terrorists through extensive analysis of the Mehanna trial. In so 
doing, this Article demonstrates the central role of the trial judge in 
directing the evolution of preventive prosecutions.  
 
Mehanna had allegedly sought terrorist training during a brief trip 
to Yemen. He subsequently engaged in extensive Internet activities, 
particularly translations, that supported jihad generally, and al-Qaeda in 
particular, and was active in disseminating this material. The first question  
addressed is how a trial court should apply the test set forth in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project (HLP)15 for criminalizing advocacy of terrorism. In 
that case, the Supreme Court announced a test based on the relationship 
between the defendant and a foreign terrorist organization—focusing on 
whether “material support [was] coordinated with or under the direction of a 
designated foreign terrorist organization.”16 Much of the “support” with 
which Mehanna was charged took the form of Internet activity such as 
translations, postings, and chats. The trial judge thus faced the difficult and 
somewhat novel task of applying HLP’s seemingly straightforward test to 
Mehanna’s rather amorphous connections with al-Qaeda.  
 
 The second question is how to reconcile the command of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 40317—which provides that the probative value of 
evidence should not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature—
with the reality that the kind of evidence that is likely to be offered in a 
material support trial may well be highly prejudicial. Such trials inevitably 
raise the question of what “sort of person” the defendant is. In Mehanna, the 
government introduced extensive evidence from the defendant’s Internet 
history in which he referred to Osama bin Laden as his real father18 and 
referenced the mutilation of American soldiers.19 Jurors also saw a photo of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011). 
15 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010). 
16 Id. (emphasis added). Although the Court’s formulations of the necessary relationship 
vary somewhat, its key point was to distinguish advocacy that might be reached from 
independent advocacy.  
17 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
18 Transcript of Record at 8-23, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. 
Mass. 2011 ). When citing to the transcript, the first number corresponds to the day of the 
trial while the following numbers correspond to the page or range of pages being cited. 
19 Id. at 22-69. 
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the defendant with friends in a celebratory posture in front of Ground 
Zero.20 The prosecution argued vigorously that such evidence provided 
context and revealed Mehanna’s state of mind.21 This, in turn, forced the 
trial judge to grapple with the question of when the “substantial prejudice” 
prohibited by Rule 403 is reached in a case about material support for 
terrorism.   
 
 The third question concerns the way in which the trial judge should 
calculate the sentence for a convicted defendant. In Mehanna, the defense 
requested a sentence of 63 to 78 months, the government recommended 
300 months, and the court’s probation office—the entity which plays the 
key role in most sentencing decisions—filed a report recommending a life 
sentence. The trial judge ultimately imposed a sentence of 210 months. 
Notwithstanding the fact that sentences can vary widely since the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) have been made advisory,22 
one is still justified in asking, why the disparity in the various 
recommendations? A close look at the Mehanna trial provides the answer. 
The question before the judge was the role that the “Terrorism 
Enhancement”23 should play in sentencing the defendant. The Terrorism 
Enhancement would have automatically increased both Mehanna’s 
“criminal history” and his “offense level,”24 the two key variables in 
determining a sentence under the Guidelines. The extension provided by 
the Terrorism Enhancement guarantees a long sentence, life in many cases. 
The judge might have engaged in the difficult inquiry of determining 
whether Mehanna met the technical requirements for the type of terrorism 
crime the Enhancement requires.25 Instead, he chose to disregard the 
Enhancement altogether, characterizing it as a “blunt instrument.”26  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Id. at 3-39. 
21 See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 3-48. 
22 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). United States v. Booker held that the 
Guidelines can only be advisory in nature. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 869–73 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the 
impact of Booker). 
23 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2009). 
24 Id. 
25 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006) (defining a “Federal Crime of Terrorism” as “an offense 
that is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or 
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct”). 
26 Transcript of Disposition at 69, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09--cr-10017-GAO (D. 
Mass. 2012). 
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 Once again, Mehanna presents a problem that will recur in 
preventive prosecutions. Congress and the United States Sentencing 
Commission apparently wanted a blunt instrument on the theory that all 
terrorism should be treated severely. However, judges, as was the case in 
Mehanna, may question whether some types of “terrorism” are different in 
kind from others. Indeed, the Terrorism Enhancement issue is part of a 
larger, continuing controversy about the force of the Guidelines—
“advisory” rather than binding since the Supreme Court’s Booker decision—
and the extent of judicial discretion to depart from or ignore them.27  
 
This Article—with its focus on the conduct of a particular trial—
joins a growing group of “granular” analyses28 of how the Article III courts 
function in individual terrorism cases, as opposed to more “macro” 
treatments of the subject.29 Two recent articles are particularly worthy of 
note. The first, Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, by 
Professor Stephen Vladeck, examines the complex prosecution of Abu Ali 
for a range of offenses, including material support, conspiracy to assassinate 
the President, and conspiracies relating to aircraft.30 Professor Vladeck 
skillfully analyzes this particular case in order to place in perspective—and 
validate—the role of Article III courts at a time when other forums, such as 
military commissions and national security courts, have been proposed as 
possible alternatives.31 Vladeck’s article focuses on the “unique difficulties” 
Article III courts face in conducting trials resulting from multinational 
counterterrorism investigations, highlighting the Abu Ali court’s struggle to 
grapple with the evidentiary use of foreign interrogations, foreign 
depositions, and difficult questions under the Classified Information 
Procedures Act (CIPA).   
 
The second article, Preferring Order to Justice, by Professors Laura 
Rovner and Jeanne Theoharis, deals with a different case—the prosecution 
of Fahad Hashmi for material support32—and reaches a different 
conclusion.33 While Hashmi ultimately pled guilty, Professors Rovner and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
28 Laura Rovner & Jeanne Theoharis, supra note 13, at 1340. 
29 See, e.g., Stephen L. Vladeck, Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, 88 TEX. 
L. Rev. 1501, 1503 (2010). 
30 Id. at 1509–10 (listing charges); see United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008). 
31 See id. at 1502 n.4 (noting proposals for “national security courts”). 
32 See Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 13, at 1347 (outlining charges). 
33 See id. at 1414 (deference to national security claims erodes courts’ role as check on the 
executive branch). 
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Theoharis argue, inter alia, that the prosecution would have unfairly 
bolstered its case by introducing into evidence controversial public 
statements in support of terrorism made by Hashmi.34 The authors use the 
Hashmi case to paint a picture of trials in Article III courts as perhaps no 
better than “indefinite detentions, military commissions and other 
manifestations of second-class due process.”35 
 
 Each of these articles provides useful insights into particular issues 
that arise from the legal system’s decision to rely primarily on Article III 
courts as the mechanism for criminal prosecution of the “war on terror.” 
This Article, likewise, focuses on the trial as the key point of entry to 
understanding how this decision has, and will continue, to play out. There 
are, however, important differences between this Article and those just 
discussed. Unlike Professor Vladeck, I do not focus on the “unique 
difficulties”36 of a case that he describes as presenting “sui generis” issues.37 
What makes Mehanna important is that its issues are not unique. They will be 
present in most, if not all terrorism trials that take on the dimension of 
preventive prosecution. While it is important to understand how federal 
courts handle extraordinary cases, it may be more important to understand 
how they handle “ordinary” ones. And unlike Professors Rovner and 
Theoharis, this Article need not speculate on what a material support 
prosecution would have looked like, because the Mehanna case actually went to 
trial.38  
 
 Notwithstanding these differences, I view this Article as broadly 
complementary with the other two. Each helps, through its own empirical 
approach, to identify pieces of a broader puzzle that will require 
considerable time to assemble. Terrorism cases place great strain on Article 
III courts. The goal of all inquiries into the role of such courts in combating 
terrorism should be to help them fulfill their mission as centers of justice, 
rather than to become a mere default forum in the “war on terror.”  Like 
Professor Vladeck, I believe that they are on the right track. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Id. at 1391–97.  
35 Id. at 1338. Earlier in the article, the authors refer to “the long history of legal lynching in 
this country and the central role the law and the courts have played in upholding/masking 
racial injustice even since the civil rights movement.” The thrust of their article is that this 
unfairness persists in today’s terrorism trials. Id. 
36 Vladeck, supra note 29, at 1504. 
37 Id. at 1528. 
38 See Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 13, at 1348–57 (discussing trial issues). 
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  Part I takes a close look at the Mehanna trial. It reviews the record in 
detail in order to provide a foundation for the subsequent discussion of the 
doctrinal and evidentiary issues that arise in preventive prosecutions. Part II 
focuses primarily on the uncertainty surrounding the application of the HLP 
test to Mehanna’s Internet activities. It also considers the future relationship 
between 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B. Part III considers the possibility 
that prejudicial evidence could taint the jury’s attitude toward the defendant 
in a preventive prosecution. The risk is real, perhaps even inevitable, since 
such prosecutions tend to focus heavily on both the defendant’s character 
and attitude towards jihad and terrorism generally. Part IV examines the 
difficult issues that arise in the sentencing of convicted defendants. The 
Guideline’s inclusion of the Terrorism Enhancement reflects Congress’ 
effort to capture the particular severity that our society attaches to terrorism 
crimes. However, this “one size fits all” approach to punishing terrorism 
offenses risks a backlash on the part of judges, who, as in Mehanna, may 
simply refuse to consider it on the grounds that it is too severe. Part V 
summarizes the crucial role of the trial judge in preventive terrorism 
prosecutions and provides a preliminary appraisal of the extent to which the 
judge in Mehanna discharged this function.  
 
I. The Mehanna Trial: An Overview 
 
A crucial variable in the outcome of preventive prosecutions is the 
manner in which the trial judge conducts the proceedings. These 
prosecutions are high-profile events in which the judge’s actions send clear 
messages both to the government and to different segments of the broader 
community. Many people will applaud the fact of prosecution, not be 
concerned with evidentiary “technicalities,” and, at sentencing, want the 
proverbial “book” thrown at the defendant. Other individuals may consider 
themselves members of a target community. They want trials that avoid 
stereotyping and that yield sentences that do not reflect a societal animus 
towards the group of which they are a part. In short, the trial judge’s actions 
may have enormous influence beyond the individual trial in question. 
Indeed, the cumulative effect of preventive trials could become a central 
component of the “war on terror.” Thus, it is particularly important to look 
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A. Overview and Statutory Background 
  
 The trial of Tarek Mehanna was long—35 days—and contentious. 
The defense moved for a mistrial on numerous occasions.39 The very fact of 
prosecution, and the result—a guilty verdict on all counts charged, resulting 
in imposition of a seventeen and one-half year sentence—have been 
intensely controversial. The case has been cited as an example of the 
“Islamophobia that still grips the U[nited] S[tates] . . . ,”40 and “stink[ing] of 
a lynch-mob mentality.”41 It has also been cited as an example of juries’ 
inherent bias in terrorism cases.42 Writing in the New York Times, a witness 
for the (unsuccessful) defense lambasted the prosecution as “a frightening 
and unnecessary attempt to expand the kinds of religious and political 
speech that government can criminalize.”43  
 
 One can find alternative views in the Boston Globe. It named the 
United States Attorney for Massachusetts “Bostonian of the Year.”44 The 
glowing article highlighted the fact that “Ortiz [the United States Attorney] 
won a noteworthy case against Tarek Mehanna of Sudbury, convicted of 
supporting al-Qaeda and plotting to kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq . . . .”45 Yet 
shortly thereafter, a Globe political columnist wrote that the verdict and 
sentence “should be lamented . . . .”46 The columnist, quoting a “leading 
civil libertarian,” stated, “I could make a translation of ‘Mein Kampf,’ and 
it would not mean that I should be arrested for having urged the killing of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 10-56, 10-62, 10-99. 
40 Ross Caputi, Tarek Mehanna: Punished for Speaking Truth to Power, THE GUARDIAN, April 16, 




42 Peter Schworm, Mehanna Conviction Stirs Outcry on Rights: Critics Contend Evidence Lacking, 
BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2011, at B13. 
43 Andrew F. March, Op-Ed., A Dangerous Mind? N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/opinion/sunday/a-dangerous-mind.html.  




46 Joan Vennochi, Tarek Mehanna Case Puts First Amendment on Trial, BOS. GLOBE, April 19, 
2012, available at http://articles.boston.com/2012-04-19/opinion/31362541_1_internet-
posts-terrorism-training-tarek-mehanna. 
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Jews and Gypsies.”47 But, the columnist argued, “[a]fter Mehanna, it 
might.”48 
 
Many of the criticisms choose to downplay and ignore, or may even 
reflect an unawareness of, the fact that the government’s complex case 
rested on several statutes and theories.49 Part II concentrates on describing 
the core of the trial: the evidence supporting conviction under two key 
material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B. Thus it is 
necessary to analyze in depth the doctrinal problems under these statutes 
that Mehanna raises.50 
 
Both statutes penalize providing “material support,” a term which is 
defined broadly to include such matters as “any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service . . . financial services . . . personnel (one or more 
individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation . . . .”51 
Section 2339A, titled “Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” 
criminalizes providing support with the “know[ledge] or inten[tion] that it is 
to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” a number of enumerated 
offenses, such as killing or the destruction of property abroad, or “the 
concealment of an escape from the commission of” such offenses.52 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 To my knowledge, no critic has come forth with a defense of lying to federal investigators 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). It may be argued that Mehanna ushers in a period of 
even more intrusive law enforcement tactics as the government seeks out potential terrorists 
within the Islamic community. These tactics will generate interactions that, in turn, 
generate false statements. Mehanna can thus be viewed as part of a slippery slope toward 
“entrapment” in a broad, lay sense of the word.  
50 See infra Section II. I will not discuss the false statement charges or the count under 18 
U.S.C. § 956 (2006). This provision makes it a crime to conspire within the United States 
“to commit at any place outside the United States an act which would constitute the offense 
of murder, kidnapping, or maiming if committed in the special maritime or territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. Section 956 is a frequent predicate offense under § 
2339A. In Mehanna’s case, this charge, while contained in a separate count, seems largely 
subsumed under the § 2339A charge. See, e.g., United States v. Amawi, No. 3:06CR719, 
2009 WL 1373155 at *2 (N.D. Ohio, May 15, 2009) (allowing same evidence to justify 
conviction under both statutes); Chesney, supra note 6, at 480 (noting use of 2339A to 
charge “aiding-and-abetting a conspiracy); id. at 486 (noting use of § 956 as a § 2339A 
predicate); Peter Margulies, Guantanamo by Other Means: Conspiracy Prosecutions and Law 
Enforcement Dilemmas After September 11, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 513, 531 (2008) (discussing cases 
in which the same facts supported prosecutions under both § 956 and § 2339A).  
51 18 U.S.C § 2339A(b)(1) (Supp. III 2009). 
52 18 U.S.C § 2339A(a). 
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scope of § 2339A appears broad, given the large number of predicate 
offenses,53 but the statute also appears to be constrained by the presence of 
some form of mens rea requirement.54 Section 2339B, on the other hand, is 
not tied to any specified offense, but to the knowing provision of material 
support to a “foreign terrorist organization.”55 The organization must be 
one that has been so designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to a 
separate statutory procedure,56 although the defendant need not know 
about this designation if he knows that the organization engages in “terrorist 
activity” or “terrorism.”57 Thus, in summarizing the statutory scheme at 
play in Mehanna, it can be said that § 2339A focuses on links between an 
individual and specified crimes, while § 2339B focuses on links between an 
individual and specified organizations.58 
 
What of Mehanna and his possible provision of material support? 
The government argued that two separate courses of conduct individually 
violated both statutes.59 The first was a trip to Yemen in February 2004 to 
seek terrorist training. The government contended that this was the agreed 
upon purpose between Mehanna and two friends, thus constituting a 
conspiracy.60 The group did not find any terrorist training camps, 
consequently receiving no training, and Mehanna returned within two 
weeks. Nonetheless, the government argued that the event could constitute 
an offense under both statutes. In regard to § 2339A, the government 
argued that what took place was at least a conspiracy or an attempt to 
furnish personnel (included in the definition of material support)61 aimed at 
the ultimate commission of two of the predicate crimes: killing abroad62 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Id. 
54 CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPT. 11, 2000-SEPT. 11, 2011 21 (2011); but see Chesney, supra note 6, at 428.  
55 18 U.S.C § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009). 
56 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6); 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006) (outlining designation process). 
57 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).  
58 With the emergence of forms of loosely organized terrorist organizations, the distinction 
may become somewhat blurred. 
59 Second Superseding Indictment at 1, 11, 19, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-
10017-GAO, 2010 WL 2516469 (D. Mass. 2011). 
60 Both material support statutes as well as 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006) (relating to false 
statements) contain a conspiracy provision. The indictment also based a separate count on 
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006), the general conspiracy statute. This conspiracy appears to be 
directed solely at the issue of false statements. 
61 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. III 2009). 
62 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 59, at 11. 
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killing Americans abroad.63 The defendants, the government maintained, 
would use this training to commit these crimes at a later time. The fact that 
they did not actually receive the training did not nullify the reasons why 
they sought it. Section 2339B could be satisfied as well if they planned to 
make themselves available to al-Qaeda.64 Of course, if the prosecution could 
not prove that Mehanna and friends went to Yemen with the intent to 
receive training in the first place, both statutory arguments would 
presumably fail for lack of mens rea. The Yemen charge—whatever its merits 
or doctrinal problems65—is simply not a matter of speech at all. 
 
The second course of conduct charged, however, is all about speech: 
whether Mehanna’s activities in translating and disseminating pro-jihadist 
materials were political speech protected by the First Amendment. After 
returning from the failed Yemen trip, Mehanna, according to the 
government, sought to advance the cause of jihad by proclaiming its 
message. He did this primarily by using the Internet, drawing on his 
computer skills, and knowledge of Arabic. Thus, for example, he translated 
jihadist materials, and posted them on a website that advocated this 
position. 
 
On the surface, both material support statutes are satisfied. The 
defendant is making available a resource as defined in the statute-whether 
viewed as “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” or “personnel.” He 
could be seen as making it available under § 2339A either to commit the 
crimes himself, or to further the cause of those who would ultimately 
commit the crimes, or, under § 2339B, to a foreign terrorist organization—
in this case al-Qaeda, an organization that the defendant apparently wished 
to help.66  
 
At this point, however, the First Amendment enters with full force, 
since speech in praise of terrorism or a terrorist organization seems clearly 
political speech that poses no danger of imminent action.67 The Supreme 
Court wrestled with the problem of speech as material support in the 2010 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Id.  
64 See Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 35–65. 
65 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 448 (discussing doctrinal problems under § 2339A).  
66 If viewed as personnel, this support would encounter the requirements of § 2339B(h) of 
direction or control. 
67 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that it is unconstitutional to 
punish political speech that creates no danger of imminent action). 
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case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP).68 The subtleties of HLP are 
dealt with in Part III.69 For present purposes it is enough to note that the 
Court attempted to draw the line between protected and unprotected 
speech by declaring that the latter could be prosecuted if done in 
coordination with or under the direction of a foreign terrorist 
organization.70 Applying the HLP test narrows the inquiry considerably, and 
also shifts its focus by asking not whether the defendant engaged in 
presumably protected speech, but by considering the relationship between 
the defendant (and his speech) and a foreign terrorist organization. The 
criticisms of Mehanna as criminalizing free speech such as translations of 
Mein Kampf or advocacy of unpopular causes look like rearguard attacks on 
HLP, if not unawareness of its holding. It may be that critics of HLP are so 
entrenched in their opposition to the case that they not only miss the fact 
that the Supreme Court drew a line in a good faith attempt to reconcile the 
First Amendment with the unique demands of terrorism prosecutions, but 
also that the line has teeth. Meeting the HLP test was perhaps the 
prosecution’s biggest hurdle in Mehanna.  
 
B. The Trial Itself 
 
This sub-part examines the evidence introduced, mainly that which 
supported the prosecution’s theory that the two courses of conduct 
described above each constituted material support.71 Separate consideration 
will be given to the extensive, more general evidence of Mehanna’s support 
for jihad. Part IV examines the question whether this evidence, including its 
cumulative nature, constituted prejudice in violation of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 to the point that a reversal is warranted.72 This Part first 
outlines this evidence, while tentatively raising the question whether the 
three distinct groups of evidence—Yemen, the speech materials, and 
general sympathies—could have had a mutually reinforcing effect. Is it 
possible, for example, that the jury was not completely satisfied that the 
government’s proof on the trip to Yemen as material support met the 
standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but that the other two groups of 
evidence impermissibly pushed that count over the line?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
69 See infra Section III.A–D. 
70 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726–27.  
71 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 59, at 1, 11. 
72 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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1. Yemen 
 
The trip to Yemen seems the most straightforward. The prosecution 
contended that Mehanna and two friends sought terrorist training, 
examined the possibilities, chose Yemen as the best location, and travelled 
there, but were unable to find any training camps.73 One of the co-
conspirators—Kareem Abuzahra—gave extensive testimony on the events 
leading up to and culminating in the trip.74 Although he returned shortly 
after arriving, his testimony bore out the prosecution’s theory of the purpose 
of the trip. In particular, Abuzahra made the key point that the conspirators 
agreed that they would use as a cover story the contention that the trip was 
a search for schools to study Islamic theology and the Arabic language.75 
 
Unfortunately for the prosecution, Abuzahra was a less than ideal 
witness. He testified under a grant of immunity,76 always a fertile ground for 
cross-examination. Abuzahra admitted that he practiced lying,77 and 
answered yes to the following question: “If you did not believe that it was in 
your best interest to tell the truth to the FBI, you would lie, right?”78 
Defense counsel did an excellent job of portraying him as an inveterate liar 
who would distort the truth to obtain a benefit.79  
 
However, the prosecution had other witnesses who testified, 
although in a less complete fashion, that Mehanna went to Yemen to find a 
terrorist training camp.80 There was also testimony that after returning from 
Yemen, Mehanna admitted failure to find what he sought.81 Additionally, 
the prosecution introduced a letter to a prospective bride who had expressed 
strong support for jihad. Mehanna’s response stated, in part, “just so you are 
aware of how serious I am . . . know that a short while back I went for an 
interview and was rejected by that company and sent back because I had no 
references to vouch for me as they don’t just hire anyone off the street.”82 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 3-29. 
74 Id. at 23-10–49. 
75 Id. at 23-13. 
76 Id. at 22-112–114. 
77 Id. at 25-46. 
78 Id. at 25-59. 
79 Id. at 25-60. Perhaps the strongest part of the cross-examination can be found in the 
transcript at 25-4–72. 
80 Id. at 14-37; see also id. at 15-168. 
81 Id. at 15-113. 
82 Id. at 26-40. 
15                                   Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 4 
sum, the prosecution put forth evidence that, if believed, supported its view 




2. The “speech” material 
 
Mehanna was a prolific user of the Internet, taking advantage of his 
computer skills and his knowledge of Arabic. He translated documents, 
posted them, and communicated arguably pro-jihadist sentiments to his 
friends via email. The prosecution contended that after returning from 
Yemen empty-handed, Mehanna continued to provide material support for 
terrorism through the “speech” material, a term used throughout this 
Article to distinguish this material from acts related to Yemen. The material 
support theory runs something like this: terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda 
need and use propaganda. Disseminating jihadist documents and viewpoints 
helps to spread the word. It can also serve as a form of recruitment. 
Mehanna thus potentially violated § 2339B by rendering support to a 
foreign terrorist organization. His actions could be viewed as meeting the 
statutory definition of material support as “service,” “personnel,” or “expert 
advice or assistance” (at least in the case of the translations). The same 
activities could also be viewed as a violation of § 2339A. The “support” (to 
unspecified terrorists) could ultimately lead to crimes such as killing or 
maiming abroad, or killing Americans abroad. The § 2339A counts 
specifically name these crimes and include the speech—as well as the 
attempt to acquire training—as criminal activity that constitutes support.84 
 
The government faced two major problems in arguing that this 
aspect of Mehanna’s activities—as opposed to the trip to Yemen—was 
illegal material support. The first was the question whether what he “said” 
was any form of support to any terrorists, organized or not. An apt 
illustration is the contrasting views of the document “39 Ways to Serve and 
Participate in Jihad,” a document which Mehanna had translated. The 
prosecution’s expert described it as an “influential” training manual in the 
following terms:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Legal issues of whether it makes no difference that he didn’t get training are discussed in 
Section III. With respect to the Yemen facts the defense’s strategy consisted mainly of 
discrediting the prosecution’s witnesses and advancing the plausibility of the schooling 
reason for the trip. See, e.g., id. at 25-8–13. 
84 See infra Section II.C. 
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It is one of the most well-known training manuals that are 
out there, instructional guides for individuals that are self-
radicalizing or self-recruiting to follow in order to get an idea 
of what they can do to help support al Qa’ida’s mission. It’s 
an official document produced by al Qa’ida. It’s not just 
produced by some random person. This is Esa al-Awshin, 
the—He’s—not only is he an official leader of al Qa’ida, but, 
more importantly, he’s essentially the leader of their media 
wing, or was the leader of their media wing before his 
demise.85 
 
On the other hand, defense experts ridiculed the notion that “39 Ways” is a 
training manual.86 The problem for the prosecution is that the “Ways” run 
the gamut from “Have Enmity Toward the Disbelievers” to “Learn to Swim 
and Ride Horses.”87 It is, of course, possible that the jury was not swayed by 
“39 Ways” but found enough exhortation to jihad in Mehanna’s other 
public utterances to find “material support.”88 
 
The government’s second problem stems from the Supreme Court’s 
HLP decision.89 In the context of § 2339B, the Court held that normally 
protected speech could be prosecuted as material support only if 
coordinated with or under the direction of a designated foreign terrorist 
organization.90 Section III, examines how this test, or a somewhat less 
burdensome one that can be derived from the Court’s opinion, might apply 
to Mehanna.91 This Section focuses on the evidence attempting to satisfy the 
test in its relatively strict form. The government relied heavily on 
Mehanna’s work for the British jihadist website Tibyan Publications, for 
which he served at one point as a moderator. The government expert 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 27-46. 
86 Id. at 31-53–54, 32-131–137. 
87 David Cole, 39 Ways to Limit Free Speech, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:15 
PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/19/39-ways-limit-free-speech/. 
88 See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 27-12–18, 27-49–52 (expert witness 
discussing the significance of al-Qaeda videos and internet activities for the organization’s 
recruitment). 
89 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
90 Id. at 2726. 
91 See infra Section II.A–D (discussing speech issues and the addition of “coordination” to 
the Holder test).  
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testified that there was a close relationship between Tibyan and al-Qaeda.92 
His testimony as to a possible Tibyan-based relationship between Mehanna 
and al-Qaeda was at best indirect.93 He did, however, note the importance 
to al-Qaeda of individuals with skills like the defendant’s and the utility to 
al-Qaeda of coordinating propagandists through online networking.94 
 
The government’s best evidence on this issue was an apparent 
request from al-Qaeda to Tibyan for a particular translation, with the 
suggestion that Mehanna do the translation.95 However, there is no 
indication that he ever did so, although there was other testimony about his 
Tibyan connection and references in his work to the website.96 The 
defendant also seemed to think of himself as a form of media wing for al-
Qaeda.97 Still, if the HLP test is to be strictly applied, this aspect of the 
government’s case seems its weakest. 
 
3. Evidence of jihadist sympathies 
 
Much of the evidence presented related more or less directly to the 
two courses of conduct alleged and his culpability under the material 
support statutes. However, a large portion of the trial was devoted to the 
presentation by the prosecution of a third category of evidence: examples of 
Mehanna’s jihadist sympathies. The prosecution told the jury at the outset 
that: 
 
You’re going to see, and you’re going to hear, a lot of the 
evidence about what the defendant was saying out of his own 
mouth, but also what the defendant was consuming, what he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 27-47. Indeed, the prosecution was able to slip in 
a question and answer about “co-ordination with al-Qaeda.” Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 27-51–52. Professor Margulies argues that “[t[he] evidence proves Mehanna’s 
coordination with Al Qaeda in two ways, one top-down, the other bottom-up. The top-
down coordination involves a course of dealing with Al Qaeda on the translation of 
religious authorizations for violence  distributed through an on-line source, At-Tibyan 
Publications.” After reviewing the government’s evidence, he views it as sufficient to 
establish the existence of a classic tacit or implied conspiracy. Thus, as to relations with At-
Tibyan, “evidence of an agreement to perform a task is key; the task need not be completed 
to prove the individual’s guilt.” Peter Margulies, Mehanna Notes and Summary (2012) 
(unpublished memorandum on file with the author). 
95 Id. at 13-19–22. 
96 See, e.g., id. at 21-136. 
97 See, e.g., id. at 21-6 (prosecutor discussing defendant’s propagation of a video of Zarqawi). 
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was reading, what he was watching. Because that all goes 
into what he was thinking at that time. This case is not 
about—it’s not illegal to watch something on the television. It 
is illegal, however, to watch something in order to cultivate 
your desire, your ideology, your plots to kill American 
soldiers, or to help those, as in this case, who were.98 
 
The prosecution insisted that these materials would help prove the 
defendant’s “intent” when he went to Yemen or translated materials.99 The 
jurors were told that such evidence “will help you assess both what the 
defendant personally did as well as what was in his state of mind, what he 
was thinking as he was engaging in this conduct.”100 Of course, mens rea is 
relevant to most crimes, and is particularly important when the defense puts 
forward plausible alternative explanations for the conduct at issue. Here, for 
example, the trip to Yemen was presented as a search for schooling, and the 
Internet activities were presented as part of a scholarly dialogue, or 
independent expression of political views. Still, it is hard not to wonder 
whether the mountain of evidence about Mehanna the person was de facto 
proof of a crime beyond those charged: that of being a terrorist sympathizer. 
Part IV of this Article examines this evidence in light of the crimes charged 
and the possibility of prejudice in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 
403.101 The goal at this stage is somewhat narrower: to present as complete 
a picture as possible of the evidence before the jury in order to lay a 
background for analysis of the important doctrinal and policy issues that the 
Mehanna trial presents. 
 
The “jihadist evidence”—a term used in this Article to refer to 
Mehanna’s general interest in and support for jihad—was obtained through 
a multiplicity of methods: a search under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of the defendant’s home and computer, intercepted emails, 
wiretapping, bugging, and witnesses wearing wires, as well as live testimony, 
particularly of co-conspirators.102 Much of the Internet materials were 
available through relatively conventional searches.103 The range of this 
evidence was broad indeed. It ran the gamut from praise of the Mujahideen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Id. at 3-38–39. 
99 Id. at 3-38. 
100 Id. at 3-41. 
101 See infra Section III.A–B. 
102 See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 4-11–29 (describing search of home). 
103 Postings on some websites were password protected. See, e.g., id. at 6-83–84. 
19                                   Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 4 
to glorification of September 11th and of Osama bin Laden.104 Some of it 
was inflammatory, such as descriptions of beheadings and Mehanna’s 
repeated reference to killing American soldiers as “Texas BBQ.”105 
 
C. Preliminary Assessment 
 
Overall, how should one assess the jury’s verdict under a standard 
such as viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution? 
The strongest part of the prosecution’s case seems to be the evidence related 
to the trip to Yemen. The government presented a witness (a co-conspirator) 
who essentially supported its entire case. Although the defense questioned 
his credibility, the verdict suggests that the jury chose to believe him. 
Moreover, there was some corroboration outside of the alleged co-
conspirator’s testimony, and the education/religious studies argument of the 
defense did not play well. For example, if this was his purpose, why did 
Mehanna return so quickly from a country where such opportunities were 
available? The fact that terrorist training opportunities were not available 
strengthened the prosecution’s explanation. 
 
As for the Internet activities, the jury may have believed the 
government’s expert with respect to their value to al-Qaeda. The weakest 
aspect of this part of the case seems to be the question of direction or 
coordination.106 It may well be that the extensive evidence concerning 
Tibyan’s jihadist leanings and the defendant’s contacts with it was enough 
to tip the scales.107 There is also the possibility that all three groups of 
evidence, as discussed above, mutually reinforced one another. The 
prosecution argued, for example, that the fact that the defendant urged 
others to join the cause demonstrated his objectives both with respect to the 
trip to Yemen and to the translations.  
 
However, there is also the possibility that the jury was prejudiced 
against a defendant to terrorism charges, either at the outset or as a result of 
unfair evidence that related more to him than to the charges.108 In order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See, e.g., id. at 8-23 (defendant referring to bin Laden as his “real father”). 
105 See, e.g., id. at 22-69. 
106 See infra Section II.B-D. 
107 See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 12-80–82; see also David Cole, supra note 
87 (discussing Mehanna’s translation of the “39 Ways” that Tibyan published). 
108 See Peter Schworm, Mehanna conviction stirs outcry on rights: Critics contend evidence lacking, BOS. 
GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2011, available at 
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put the Mehanna trial in clearer perspective—and to draw lessons from it for 
the future—it is important to examine more deeply the doctrinal 
underpinnings of such trials and the manner in which they should be 
conducted. Moreover, there is the question of what to do with a defendant 
found guilty after a trial. Here, the trial judge’s extraordinary action in 
choosing to disregard the “Terrorism Enhancement” portion of the 
Sentencing Guidelines brings to the fore an issue relatively unexplored in 
the literature: if terrorists are subject to the criminal law, including the 
Guidelines, and the conduct that constitutes “terrorism” varies widely, how 
should the legal system deal with a portion of the Guidelines that decrees 
that all terrorists are to be treated alike?109 
 
II. Doctrinal Issues in Mehanna 
 
A significant aspect of Mehanna is that, if the verdict is upheld, the 
government may have succeeded in pushing the doctrinal envelope as to 
when a material support case can be brought. It thus represents a possible 
step further back in the chain of conduct toward preventive prosecution in 
the broad sense of preventing development of terrorists rather than 
commission of terrorist acts. While much of the commentary on Mehanna 
has focused on its First Amendment implications, the case also raises 
profound issues regarding the reach of § 2339A. Nonetheless, out of 
deference to the many critics who have treated Mehanna as a First 
Amendment case,111 this section will first examine the role Mehanna occupies 
as one of the first prosecutions to apply HLP. After reviewing the Court’s 
treatment of the relationship between speech and material support in HLP, 
this section then examines the application of § 2339B and § 2339A, 
respectively, to Mehanna’s speech activities. It then considers one of the 
more underreported consequences of the Mehanna prosecution, namely, 
the extent to which it has expanded the already broad scope of § 2339A.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2011/12/22/tarek-mehanna-conviction-draws-
sharply-divided-reactions/I73lyAEVWYdBtGLIoi6LBJ/story.html?camp=pm. 
109 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2011); see also infra Section IV.B 
(discussing the “Terrorism Enhancement”). 
111 According to Nancy Murray of the Massachusetts branch of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, “this case is being used by the government to really narrow First 
Amendment activity in dangerous new ways.” Adam Serwer, Does Posting Jihadist Material 
Make Tarek Mehanna a Terrorist?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 16, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/12/tarek-mehanna-terrorist. According to 
Carol Rose of the same organization, “it’s official. There is a Muslim exception to the First 
Amendment.” Vennochi, supra note 46. 




Mehanna is one of the first cases to apply the test established by the 
Supreme Court in HLP to an actual prosecution. Count One of the Mehanna 
indictment, which alleges a conspiracy to violate § 2339B, recites the 
defendant’s speech activities as one of its bases.110 HLP was a pre-
enforcement challenge by plaintiffs who wished to render assistance in the 
form of speech to designated foreign terrorist organizations.111 Over a 
strong dissent by three justices on First Amendment grounds,112 the majority 
held that § 2339B could reach such speech even if, apparently, it would 
otherwise be protected by the First Amendment.113 The Court’s opinion 
deferred to Congress’ desire to “delegitimize” foreign terrorist 
organizations, relying heavily on the expertise of the political branches and 
their emphasis on prevention.114 
 
The Court drew an important line, however, between speech that 
could constitute illegal material support and that which could not, noting 
that “independent advocacy that might be viewed as promoting [a] group’s 
legitimacy is not covered.”115 Covered activity consists of advocacy that is 
directly linked to a foreign terrorist organization. Unfortunately, the Court’s 
formulations of what constitutes such a direct linkage vary in ways that pose 
problems for lower courts applying HLP. The Court first noted that § 2339B 
itself contains an exemption, in the context of personnel, for independent 
actors, including speakers: “Material support that constitutes ‘personnel’ is 
defined as knowingly providing a person ‘to work under that terrorist 
organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or 
otherwise direct the operation of that organization.’”116 The Court 
appeared initially to equate the statutory standard for personnel with the 
constitutional requirements.117 However, it later appeared to broaden the 
test for all forms of support as one of material support that is “coordinated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 59, at 1–10. 
111 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010). 
112 See id. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting on the grounds that the material support statute 
unconstitutionally infringes on free speech). 
113 See id. at 2724 (holding that the statute does not infringe on free speech because it 
punishes the action of giving material support, not speech). 
114 See id. at 2725. 
115 Id. at 2726. 
116 Id. at 2721 (quoting § 2339B(h)).  
117 Id. at 2726. 
2012 / Notes on a Terrorism Trial  22 
with or under the direction of a designated foreign terrorist 
organization.”118 The addition of the notion of coordination appears to 
make the relationship requirement easier to satisfy outside the context of 
personnel, since direction is no longer required. This loosening goes further 
when the opinion states that “Congress has avoided any restriction on 
independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated 
with or controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”119 Furthermore, the Court 
interpreted the statute’s prohibition on the provision of a “service” to a 
foreign terrorist organization as applying only to “concerted activity, not 
independent advocacy.”120  
 
HLP has been sharply criticized, although not on the ground of 
uncertainty in its test. Critics have focused on the apparent departure from 
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence represented by cases such as 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,121 and even invoked the specter of Korematsu.122 Justice 
Breyer, in dissent, argued that independent expressions of support might 
actually help a terrorist organization more than those by persons associated 
with it.123 With this in mind, the Court’s holding is best defended as placing 
the relationship between the speaker and terrorist organization (i.e., whether 
it is “coordinated with or under the direction of a foreign terrorist 
organization”124), rather than the content of the speech itself, at the center 
of analysis of a terrorism-related speech issue.125 The Court, in its own 
estimation, simply gave effect to Congress’ intent in § 2339B to weaken 
terrorist organizations by holding that the First Amendment did not 
prohibit the penalizing of material support for terrorist groups, even if that 
material support took the form of speech in some cases.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Id. (emphasis added). Of course, if the material support takes the form of personnel, the 
statutory test would still have to be met. 
119 Id. at 2726 (emphasis added). 
120 Id. at 2721 (emphasis added). 
121 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project 
and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1504–05 (2011). 
122 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see Material Support for Terrorism, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 259, 267 (2010). 
123 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2737. 
124 Id. at 2726.  
125 See id. at 2724 (“[The issue] is not whether the Government may prohibit pure political 
speech, or may prohibit material support in the form of conduct. It is instead whether the 
Government may prohibit what plaintiffs want to do—provide material support to 
[terrorist groups] in the form of speech.”). 
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While the Court’s distinction between speech that constitutes 
material support and speech that constitutes independent advocacy is clear 
in the abstract, application of the test is more difficult. The Court 
conspicuously declined to address the issue of how much direction or 
coordination is necessary for speech actions to amount to material 
support.126 The activities of someone like Mehanna, for example, may be 
viewed as directed to al-Qaeda. Perhaps he even operated in some loose 
form of relationship with al-Qaeda. But showing direction from or 
coordination with al-Qaeda is no easy task. Mehanna thus raises the issue of 
limits on when the government can curtail speech. The case certainly 
provides an important opportunity for lower court application of HLP. 
Indeed, in what constitutes perhaps the ultimate irony, Georgetown Law 
Professor David Cole, who argued for the losing side in HLP, has invoked it 
to argue that Mehanna went beyond HLP’s line. Quoting the Court, 
Professor Cole argued that prosecuting Mehanna constituted a “restriction 
on independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, 
coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”127 
 
It is still too early to tell if lower courts will apply the relationship 
requirement strictly or liberally when determining whether a defendant’s 
speech acts cross the line from independent advocacy to material support. 
However, two recent Court of Appeals decisions suggest a surprisingly 
liberal approach. In United States v. Farhane,128 the Second Circuit upheld the 
conviction under § 2339B of a physician who swore an oath of allegiance to 
al-Qaeda, promised to be on call to treat wounded members of the 
organization in Saudi Arabia, and gave his telephone number to an 
undercover operative posing as a member of al-Qaeda. The oath was 
worded as a statement of agreement with the organization’s mission.129 The 
court stated that “[f]rom the totality of these facts, a reasonable jury could 
have concluded that [the defendant] crossed the line from simply professing 
radical beliefs or joining in a radical organization to attempting a crime, 
specifically, [his] provision of himself as personnel to work under the 
direction and control of al-Qaeda.”130 A possible implication of the decision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Id. at 2722 (refusing to answer the question of “how much direction or coordination is 
necessary for an activity to constitute a ‘service’” within the meaning of § 2339A because it 
is “entirely hypothetical” and thus inappropriate for resolution in a pre-enforcement 
challenge).  
127 Cole, supra note 87.  
128 United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011). 
129 Id. at 132–34. 
130 Id. at 150. 
2012 / Notes on a Terrorism Trial  24 
is that unilateral action on the part of a defendant is enough. There was no 
direction or control from al-Qaeda or coordination with it.131 The conduct 
might be viewed as an “attempt” to provide material support,132 which 
would satisfy the statute, although perhaps not the Constitution. Similarly, 
taking an oath played a large role in the recent Eleventh Circuit decision in 
United States v. Augustin,133 although there were other acts, such as 
videotaping an FBI building for an undercover agent.134 
 
Readings of HLP that allow punishment of seemingly independent 
advocacy on the grounds of a unilateral desire to help a foreign terrorist 
organization would almost certainly go too far. In order to protect 
independent advocacy, HLP appears to limit criminalization to advocacy 
that could strengthen a particular organization itself—e.g., by augmenting its 
resources—as opposed to merely increasing the level of support for its 
message.135 The introduction of “coordination” may relax the standard of 
“direction and control” somewhat, but a showing of coordination would still 
require some relationship with the organization; unilateral action is 
insufficient.136  While this keeps the constitutional standard in harmony with 
the congressional purpose, it also creates a line of proscribed conduct that is 
difficult to locate in practice.137  
 
Against this background, Mehanna’s conviction might be viewed as 
an effort by the government to broaden HLP. Judge O’Toole’s instructions 
show a careful consideration of the Supreme Court’s message to lower 
courts, particularly the importance of protecting independent advocacy, 
even if the defendant “is advancing the organization’s goals or 
objectives.”138 The instruction makes that point and continues: “Rather, for 
a person to be guilty under [conspiracy to violate § 2339B], a person must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See id. at 175-83 (Dearie, C.J., dissenting in part). 
132 But see id. (arguing that attempt standard not met). 
133 United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011). 
134 Id. at 1114. 
135 See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct at 2726 (“Independent advocacy that might be 
viewed as promoting [a terrorist] group's legitimacy is not covered.”). 
136 The importance of independent advocacy probably rules out the possibility of an 
“attempt” crime when the support is given to an undercover agent, regardless of the 
general law on attempt and impossibility. See, e.g., 2 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 11.5. 
137 See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 740 F. Supp. 2d 494, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
but see United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (deciding case prior to 
the current definition of “personnel,” which was first included in § 2339B on December 17, 
2004).  
138 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 35-24. 
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be acting in coordination with or at the direction of a designated foreign 
terrorist organization, here, as alleged in Count 1, [al-Qaeda].”139 Thus, no 
matter how much independent speech Mehanna engaged in, such conduct 
could not, by itself, constitute an offense, although it might serve other 
purposes such as showing intent.140 By contrast, the defense’s requested 
instruction would have gone further in requiring that “the person . . . have a 
direct connection to the group and be working directly with the group for it to 
be a violation of the statute.”141 
 
Let us assume, however, that Judge O’Toole’s instruction on Count 
One (conspiracy to violate § 2339B) correctly stated the law. In reviewing 
the conviction—a review in which the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government142—the key question would seem to be how far 
one can stretch the meaning of “coordination.” It is here that the 
prosecution may be said to widen the scope of what constitutes material 
support. Mehanna worked with Tibyan, although they eventually had a 
falling out.143 There was some evidence of a relationship between Tibyan 
and al-Qaeda, and a suggestion that the latter wanted him as a translator for 
a particular matter.144 But the prosecution may be suggesting a broader 
meaning of coordination. They repeatedly referred to Osama bin Laden’s 
call for Muslims to take up jihad and to the actions of the defendant and his 
associates to respond to that call.145 Taken to its extreme, this view of 
“coordination” would be close to that of a “global jihad movement” that has 
emerged under § 2339A.146 It also comes close to the idea of a one-way 
coordination discussed above.147 However, the prosecution could contend 
that any such coordinated activity must relate in some way to al-Qaeda, 
since its leader issued the call. The prosecution’s expert seems to have had 
this in mind when he referred to “al-Qaeda adherents.”148 Nonetheless, as 
the worldwide terrorism movement becomes more decentralized—as “al-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Id. 
140 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).  
141 Defendant’s Motion for Preliminary Instruction to the Jury, United States v. Mehanna, 
No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011) (emphasis added) (drawing attention to the issue of 
one-way coordination).  
142 United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 540 (5th Cir. 2011). 
143 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 6-46. 
144 See, e.g., id. at 3-48-49, 12-73. 
145 Id. at 3-37, 3-48.  
146 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 427–28. Thus any form of terrorism or support would be 
part of a generalized conspiracy.  
147 See supra Section III.A (discussing one-way coordination in Farhane and Augustin).  
148 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 26-135, 27-31. 
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Qaeda” devolves into a proliferation of loosely affiliated groups and 
individuals—this limiting principle may not seem like much of a limit.149  
 
As an alternative, the prosecution may view the notion of conspiracy 
to violate § 2339B through speech as a way around that section’s substantive 
requirements as established in HLP. Courts have generally been receptive to 
the idea of conspiracy and not receptive to the defense of impossibility.150 
The conspiracy is viewed as a separate evil, distinct from the substantive 
crime.151 In the terrorism context, the concept of material support has been 
analyzed as closely related to conspiracy, particularly the techniques which 
conspiracy affords to reach large numbers of people and people somewhat 
distant from the ultimate crime.152 
 
But what is the object crime in Mehanna? Professor Cole argues that 
“conspiracy to engage in jihadist advocacy, in the hopes that it will aid [al-
Qaeda], without more is simply a conspiracy to engage in independent 
advocacy. And that is [not]—and could not be—a crime.”153 Of course, 
conspiracy is usually viewed as separate from the object crime.154 Assuming 
that a conspiracy was in place at all relevant times,155 the prosecution could 
argue that in order to provide material support, Mehanna had to start by 
acting independently so that he could come to al-Qaeda’s attention, and 
ultimately achieve a state of coordination with it. This is precisely how he 
reached his position with Tibyan. Thus, there was a conspiracy to provide 
material support in the form of speech to al-Qaeda by engaging in forms of 
speech that it would come to trust and want. This view of a conspiracy is 
slightly different from alternatives suggested by Professor Margulies: both 
that Mehanna’s activities had put him in a tacit conspiracy with it, and that 
his extensive pro-jihad interactions with individuals reached the point of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 As currently written, however, § 2339B is only triggered by the fact of designation of 
some organization. 
150 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 12.1. 
151 See, e.g., State v. Moretti, 244 A. 2d 499 (N.J. 1968) (noting that conspiracy focuses on 
the defendant’s intent, as opposed to the focus in attempt prosecutions on the ultimate 
crime). 
152 Chesney, supra note 6, at 447–49; see also LAFAVE, supra note 8, at § 12.1.  
153 Benjamin Wittes, David Cole and Peter Margulies: An Exchange on Tarek Mehanna, LAWFARE, 
Apr. 22, 2012, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/david-cole-and-peter-
margulies-an-exchange-on-tarek-mehanna/ 
154 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 12.1. 
155 It is not entirely clear when the conspiracy should be viewed as over. 
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“bottom-up” conspiracy.156 As he puts it, “[t]he bottom-up coordination 
involves concrete interactions with individuals furthering Al Qaeda’s goal of 
recruiting fighters against U.S. personnel abroad.”157 
 
In sum, Mehanna occupies an important place as an early post-HLP 
case. Given the uncertainties on speech alone, it has the potential to reach 
the Supreme Court. If actors like Mehanna proliferate, and the preventive 
paradigm remains in effect, the Court is likely to revisit § 2339B. In any 
event, the case itself, and a likely First Circuit decision, bring the problem of 
applying HLP into further relief. 
 
B. First Amendment Issues and § 2339A 
 
Since HLP, discussion of the possibility that the material support 
statutes might permit prosecution of normally protected speech has focused 
on § 2339B.158 A principal issue with that statute is, of course, whether the 
direction, coordination, or control test separates truly independent advocacy 
from the narrow category of speech that could be prosecuted as providing 
material support to terrorist organizations. Assuming that this is a real limit, 
the question arises whether the government can somehow sidestep it by 
prosecuting speech under § 2339A. This statute requires no connection with 
a foreign terrorist organization—designated or not—and contains no 
language about direction or control.159 The broad general reading of § 
2339A—discussed below160—permits targeting support for a type of crime 
against unspecified persons at some unspecified point in the future. The 
statute represents a possible end run around § 2339B’s restrictions. 
Apparently the Mehanna prosecution saw it as an alternative. 
 
Count Two of the indictment states a conspiracy to violate § 2339A, 
based on two of its predicate crimes: conspiracy to kill, maim or injure 
persons or damage property in a foreign country,161 and, extraterritorial 
homicide of a U.S. national.162 The indictment alleges that Mehanna’s trip 
to Yemen to acquire the training necessary to commit these crimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Margulies, supra note 94. 
157 Id. 
158 See, e.g., Said, supra note 121. 
159 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (Supp. III 2009). This subsection was added in 2004. 
160 See infra Section III.C. 
161 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006). 
162 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2006). 
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constitutes an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.163 It also alleges 
that the overt act requirement is met by Mehanna’s speech activities, 
including a video that he sent “to multiple associates”164 that “depicts, in 
detail, the mutilation and abuse of the remains of U.S. personnel in Iraq.”165 
The video contains a preface that shows a still image of Osama bin Laden 
as his voice is heard thanking the Iraqi mujahideen for their continued 
attacks on America and its allies; bin Laden tells the viewer that these 
mujahideen “made all Muslims proud.”166 The prosecution’s opening 
statement also emphasized that the speech activities were separate from the 
Yemen trip. It referred to the defendant’s translation service as aimed at a 
broad group—both locals and individuals met on the Internet—“who also 
wanted to support the objectives and the goals of al Qa’ida and the 
terrorists, to kill Americans, to get them out of Iraq and Afghanistan.”167 
The statement described “39 ways,” a training manual to help people do 
this,168 and presented Mehanna as a would-be jihadist who had failed 
himself, but now wanted to help others.169  Thus, § 2339A may present the 
possibility of getting at speech related to future terrorist crimes, without § 
2339B’s requirement of a link to, or relationship with, a designated foreign 
terrorist organization. The speech can be seen as facilitating down-the-road 
crimes, in harmony with the approach of section 2339A. 
 
Of course, an end run around the HLP test would only be an 
attempted end run around the Constitution. Thus, it is helpful to recall how 
HLP went about delineating the narrow area in which the government can 
prosecute normally protected speech. Although Justice Breyer suggested in 
dissent that the Court had not applied strict scrutiny,170 the Court’s opinion 
can be read as doing so, particularly as it characterized the government’s 
role in combating terrorism as “an urgent objective of the highest order.”171 
The Court’s test—“[t]he statute reaches only material support coordinated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 59, at 14-15. 
164 Id. at 17. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 3-32. 
168 Id. 
169 See id. at 3-29. One might perhaps argue that Count Two contains the speech acts 
because they are only relevant to a conspiracy, but the prosecution’s remarks put the 
speech acts as one of two “principal ways” in which the defendant sought to help terrorists.  
170 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2734 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
171 Id. at 2724 (majority opinion). 
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with or under the direction of a designated foreign terrorist 
organization”172—was based on its agreement with the government that 
such organizations play a key role in fomenting terrorism.173 Whether this 
remains an accurate view of the nature of terrorism in a more decentralized 
landscape does not change the fact that the Court’s analysis rested on 
acceptance of this characterization174 
 
The HLP test does not fit the typical situation covered by § 2339A: 
aid given to help in the commission of one of over forty designated predicate 
crimes.175 The Court’s focus was a direct one on organizations, rather than 
an indirect one on down-the-road crimes, regardless of who commits them. 
It is hard to see the Court formulating an analogous approach to § 2339A 
with its potentially amorphous link to over forty crimes, many of which are 
often committed by persons other than terrorists.176 Since the issue is one of 
support of crimes, as opposed to organizations, there would be a strong pull 
to utilize a traditional First Amendment test, with its Brandenburg-based 
approach to imminence.177 Under such an approach, a § 2339A prosecution 
of Mehanna’s speech would be doomed. Still, the government may have 
planted the seed for a view of material support in the form of speech that 
avoids the rigors of HLP. 
 
C. Section 2339A and its Limits 
 
Critics of the Mehanna outcome have, as noted, devoted most of their 
attention to its implications for the First Amendment. However, several 
have raised concerns regarding Mehanna’s conviction under § 2339A for 
providing material support to al-Qaeda by seeking terrorist training in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Id. at 2726. 
173 Id. at 2724–29. 
174 It seems likely that the Court would wait for Congress to act in making a serious change 
in the nature of the organizations subject to § 2339B and the accompanying designation 
process. The question is likely to arise in attempts to use § 2339B against non-designated 
organizations that have a loose affiliation with a designated organization. 
175 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. III 2009) (criminalizing providing material support or 
resources, “knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying 
out, a violation of [enumerated crimes]”). 
176 See infra Section III.C (discussing the operation of § 2339A and the possibility of 
uncertain criminal activity at some future point).  
177 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (finding that mere advocacy of a 
crime is not enough to overcome First Amendment protections unless the speech creates an 
imminent danger of its commission); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.2.5 (4th ed. 2011). 
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Yemen, despite failing to find any such training during his trip.178 The 
worry is that a conviction on these facts expands the already broad reach of 
§ 2339A. This subsection addresses whether Mehanna was an example of the 
prosecution pushing for a broader reading. Indeed, it is surprising that the 
critics have not devoted more attention to this portion of the case and to the 
breadth of § 2339A generally. In their haste to focus on the First 
Amendment dimensions of the verdict, critics may be missing a far more 
significant aspect of the use of the material support concept to engage in 
preventive prosecution and to reach potential terrorist conduct in its early 
stages.179  
 
It is necessary to first consider the operation of this statute, which 
Professor Chesney has described as “the most capacious option” available in 
preventive prosecutions.180 The statute seems on its face to be narrow. It 
essentially requires the provision of material support or resources, 
“[k]nowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for or in 
carrying out a violation of [a number of predicate crimes]”.181 Professor 
Chesney notes that the forty-seven predicate offenses are not necessarily 
uniquely terrorism crimes.182 The requirement of knowledge or specific 
intent with respect to the use of the support or resources has often led to the 
view that § 2339A is a relatively narrow statute.183 However, the plain 
language of the statute does not reflect the extremely broad uses to which it 
has been put. Indeed, Professor Chesney describes the narrow view of § 
2339A as “a mistaken impression.”184 The government’s successful use of § 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 See, e.g., Vennochi, supra note 46. 
179 For example, Professors Rovner and Theoharis, in examining the prosecution of Sayed 
Hashmi, devote a page and a half to that of Mehanna. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 13, at 
1353–54. Section 2339A merits only one sentence in a footnote. Id. at 1354, n. 97. They 
regard both prosecutions as preventive. Id. at 1348. 
180 Chesney, supra note 6, at 474.  
181 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. III 2009). 
182 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 479. He also points out the importance of the fact that the 
statute goes on to criminalize provision of material support “in preparation for or in 
carrying out the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation . . . .” 
Id. 
183 See, e.g., Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 297, 347–48 (2008); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 
2740–42 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
184 Chesney, supra note 6, at 478. Chesney notes that “[t]his may reflect the fact that most 
conspiracy prosecutions are not truly preventive in nature and thus provide little occasion 
for inquiries into this aspect of the agreement element,” because “typically, defendants 
already have completed [or attempted] to carry out the objective of the conspiracy . . . .” Id. 
at 451.  
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2339A has built on the already broad concepts of conspiracy law, including 
the notion that mere contemplation of an offense is sufficient to form a 
conspiracy.185 As Professor Chesney notes, § 2339A is actually “broader 
than conspiracy liability in several respects.”186 He points out that no 
agreement need be shown, that mere preparation is enough, and that the 
broad definition of material support includes personnel, such that “one 
might violate § 2339A by providing one’s self as personnel to others with the 
goal of assisting in the commission, or simply preparation for the 
commission of, the predicate offense . . . .”187 As with conspiracy, a general 
knowledge of the type of offense that might be committed could be enough 
to trigger liability under the statute. One district court in a § 2339A 
conspiracy prosecution made the following response to the defendant’s 
contention that there was no specific plan or agreement beyond his general 
interest in a discussion with co-defendants about training, security, and 
defense tactics: “[T]hat doesn’t matter. Ultimate actions and targets—if the 
government establishes the basic illegal agreement and purpose beyond a 
reasonable doubt—can be un-or ill-defined and inchoate.”188   
 
Professor Chesney devotes considerable attention to the case of 
United States v. Hayat189 (the quoted discussion concerns Hayat’s son, Hamid). 
Hamid had taken a trip to Pakistan, during which the government plausibly 
argued he had received terrorist training. He also held strong views about 
jihad and was quoted, for example, to the effect that the widely publicized 
killing of American journalist Daniel Pearl was a good thing.190 Hamid was 
prosecuted under § 2339A, but, as Professor Chesney asks, “[w]as Hamid 
now a terrorist who intended to carry out attacks upon returning to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 12.1(C). 
186 Chesney, supra note 6, at 479. At the same time, he stresses the breadth of conspiracy 
itself: “[T]here is no need to prove that the agreement evolved [beyond the type of offense] 
to the point of specifying the details of executing the offense . . . .” Id. at 456. 
187 Id. at 479–80 (“That subtle distinction . . . has the practical effect of . . . reaching beyond 
the offenses themselves to encompass anticipatory activity intended to culminate in offense 
conduct.”).     
188 United States v. Amawi, No. 3:06CR719, 2009 WL 1373155, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 
2009).  
189 First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Hayat, No. 05-cr-240 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 
22, 2005). 
190 Professor Chesney cites this as a typical dilemma in preventive prosecution. See Chesney, 
supra note 6, at 487 (“[W]hether Hamid was prepared to take up arms in the name of the 
global Jihad movement was less clear . . . .”). Indeed, Professor Chesney views as one of the 
main problems with § 2339A the fact that the global Jihad movement can, in effect, 
substitute for § 2339B’s requirement of a specific organization. Id. 
2012 / Notes on a Terrorism Trial  32 
United States, or merely a misguided young man seeking adventure abroad 
without any intent to cause harm to others in the future?”191 
 
Returning to Mehanna, should the fact that he did not find any 
terrorist training make a difference under § 2339A? If one accepts the broad 
interpretations given to the statute so far, this fact may not make a 
difference, at least for purposes of conspiracy and attempt charges.192 
Mehanna sought to receive military training that would facilitate his 
committing a type of crime, in particular, two of those specified in § 2339A 
as predicate crimes: killing abroad; and, killing Americans abroad.193 The 
specific place and victim are not relevant. The prosecution has satisfied 
conspiracy requirements and the trip to Yemen would certainly be a 
substantial step that satisfied the normal requirements of an attempt 
crime.194 Failure to receive any training might, however, negate an actual 
substantive charge of material support, because Mehanna never completed 
the process of providing himself as “personnel” to any identifiable person or 
organization. 
 
The problem with the § 2339A charges should then be immediately 
apparent: they raise the question of whether Mehanna was prosecuted for 
engaging in terrorist conduct, preparing and planning to do so, or for simply 
wanting to do so. Was this a case more of incapacitation or prevention? The 
prosecution offered some testimony on interest in civilian targets, but any 
attempts to attack such targets appear not to have proceeded very far. His 
case is thus distinct from United States v. Amawi, where the defendant 
disseminated a video on how to construct bomb vests for suicide attacks and 
showed great interest in specific military techniques such as sniper attacks, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 488.  Professor Chesney goes on to present a particularly 
trenchant critique of the use of § 2339A in the Hayat case.  Professor Chesney also indicates 
a preference for the use of 18 U.S.C. § 2339D (2006), which makes it a crime to “knowingly 
receive[] military-type training from or on behalf of any organization designated at the time 
of the training . . . .”  See Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive 
Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 688 (2009).  
192 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 60, at 11, 19. Note that because of the 
presence of identified co-conspirators, a connection to the global Jihad movement is not 
necessary to prove any conspiracy, although there remains the question whether the fact 
that a person is somehow part of this movement and that Jihadists commit the predicate 
crimes is potentially enough to satisfy § 2339A conspiracy charges. 
193 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006); 18 U.S.C § 2332 (2006). 
194 See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 11.5. Judge O’Toole instructed the jury that impossibility of 
completing the crime would not be a defense to the attempt charge. Transcript of Record, 
supra note 18, at 35-31, 32. 
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despite not having traveled abroad.195 Indeed, if Mehanna had not actually 
gone to Yemen, a conspiracy prosecution under § 2339A might still be 
possible under present law, as long as seeking terrorist training was discussed 
as a goal. He would seem no less dangerous than he was after the failed trip. 
This possibility is disturbing if one envisages prosecutions for little more 
than discussion and bold talk. These discussions, after all, would be about 
the possibility of going to Yemen, which could possibly lead to training 
which could possibly lead to crimes against unknown individuals. The 
question becomes whether a general desire to fight Americans viewed as 
occupying Arab lands, notably Iraq, at some point stretches the concept of 
specificity of the type of offense too far. At some point, the limits to 
conspiracy theory would break down, and a prosecution of Mehanna for 
this crime would seem to run into obstacles based on principles of due 
process as well of association and speech. Of course, Mehanna did go to 
Yemen. The fact that he did not find training probably does not take the 
case out of the reach of § 2339A as it has been developed. The government 
runs some risk that at some point an appellate court will consider whether 
that reach is excessive. Mehanna could be the vehicle for such an 
examination, but the crucial point would not be whether he received 
training but whether it was criminal for him to go as far as he did. 
 
D. Section 2339B and Yemen 
 
The Yemen-related acts were included in Count One—charging a 
conspiracy to violate § 2339B. The language of this statute, as opposed to § 
2339A, is restrictive with regard to personnel.  It provides as follows:  
 
No person may be prosecuted under this section in 
connection with the term ‘personnel’ unless that person has 
knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to 
provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more 
individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under 
that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to 
organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 United States v. Amawi, No. 3:06CR719, 2009 WL 1373155, at *1–*2 (N.D. Ohio May 
15, 2009); see also Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2010). Koubriti was a 
Bivens action arising out of a terrorism prosecution. During the course of that § 2339A 
prosecution, the evidence showed substantial activity on the part of the then defendant, 
including “casing” of prospective targets and acts viewed as consistent with terrorism such 
as document and credit fraud and attempting to obtain commercial truck licenses for 
transporting hazardous material.  
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operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely 
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to 
advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be 
working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction 
and control.196  
  
In a conspiracy charge, it is possible to argue that Mehanna agreed to seek 
the necessary link and that such an agreement is sufficient to constitute a 
conspiracy to violate § 2339B, at least if it were shown that he believed that 
any training would have come from al-Qaeda. However, the total absence 
of any link seems at odds with the statute’s goal of weakening foreign 
terrorist organizations. The fact that the direction or control language was 
added to the statute after the Yemen trip reinforces and clarifies, but does 
not change this goal. The prosecution presented the Yemen trip, and related 
circumstances, to the jury as enough to satisfy all the substantive crimes 
charged.197 However, the primary role of the Yemen trip appears to be to 
satisfy § 2339A, given the emphasis on future crimes to which the training 
could lead. The fit with § 2339B is questionable.  
 
III. Prejudicial Evidence: A Special Danger in Preventive Prosecutions 
 
On the twenty-first day of the trial, one of Mehanna’s lawyers 
argued an evidentiary issue in the following terms: 
 
MS. BASSIL [counsel for Mehanna]: I really think we have 
finally, I would suggest, tipped the balance on prejudicial 
over probative and cumulative. To date, we have seen 16 
videos. We have had two oral descriptions of beheadings. 
We have seen one video of someone with a bomb. We have 
seen three clips of Diverse Operations in Iraq. We have 
seen two photographs of the front of a video cassette 
entitled, "Martyrs of Bosnia." We have seen, I think, two to 
three pictures of Osama bin Laden, the same of Zarqawi, 
and a picture of Zawahiri. We've seen two clips of planes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (Supp. III 2009). This provision is a primary source of the broader 
constitutional test for the punishment of speech as material support found in HLP. It does 
not apply to other forms of material support such as service, and is found in § 2339B but 
not § 2339A. 
197 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 35-65. See also id. at 40-41 (depicting trip as “an 
attempt to provide support to foreign terrorists by providing themselves as personnel to 
fight American forces in Iraq”). 
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crashing into the World Trade Center; three photographs 
of wounded American soldiers; three photographs of flags, 
American flags, draped over caskets; and a photo of a 
United States soldier crying. We've seen endless photos of 
mujahideens with guns and rocket-propelled grenade 
launchers.198 
 
As the above quote suggests, the issue of prejudicial evidence was hotly 
contested in Mehanna. The prosecution justified its extensive use of 
potentially inflammatory evidence by contending:  
 
These exhibits help set the background, or canvas, on 
which the picture of the defendant can be drawn, that is, a 
man who was motivated by and admired the leaders of al-
Qaida and their successful attacks against the United States 
and her interests, and who desire [sic] to help fight against 
and kill American servicemen overseas, whether he could 
do it himself or convince others to do so.199 
   
The defense’s objections ranged from accusations of “character 
assassination”200 to the contention that the prosecution was attempting to 
utilize prejudice in order to make up for its lack of any solid evidence of 
coordination with al-Qaeda.201 
 
The primary focus of this Article thus far has been on the material 
support statutes and the doctrinal issues they present. This Section, and the 
Section on sentencing that follows, turn to the role of the trial judge. While 
appellate courts are far from absent—especially in the sentencing context—
the trial judge is front and center in preventive prosecutions. 
 
A. The General Framework  
This Section considers the overall approach to prejudicial evidence, 
with special reference to terrorism trials in general, and Mehanna’s in 
particular. As Mehanna illustrates, the issue of prejudicial evidence is likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Id. at 21-7. 
199 Id. at 35-42. 
200 Id. at 22-103. The defense also accused the prosecution of trying to “poison the jury.” Id. 
at 10-54. 
201 Id. at 10-7, 10-53. 
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be an important one in material support cases, particularly as the preventive 
approach moves more toward focusing on the defendant as a person, that is, 
on the defendant’s mindset and motives that underlie possibly ambiguous 
conduct. As an initial matter, the admissibility of such evidence is governed 
by Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which states that a court “may exclude 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by any of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury . . . 
.”202 The exclusion of prejudicial, confusing, and misleading evidence is 
closely linked to the prohibition on character evidence under Rule 404(b), 
which states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion that person acted in accordance with the character.”203  
This prohibition might seem crucial, especially in terrorism cases, but the 
rule then proceeds to dilute its effect by allowing admissibility “for another 
purpose such as proving motive . . . .”204 As the evidentiary issues in 
Mehanna demonstrate, terrorism cases present a fine line between character 
evidence and showing the underlying state of mind.205 Anything the 
prosecution introduces to show a strong interest in jihad may also have the 
effect of showing an inclination to commit it. Beyond that link to the 
prohibition of character evidence, Rule 403 reflects a general concern with 
jury “misdecision.”206 Of course, most evidence is prejudicial to the 
opposing party, otherwise it would not be offered in the first place.207 This 
fact is reflected in the Rule’s prohibition of unfairly prejudicial evidence that 
substantially outweighs its probative value. 
 
Rule 403 is not toothless, although its uncertain impact is further 
diluted by substantial deference on the part of appellate courts.208 For this 
reason, it is important to consider the factors appellate courts have 
considered when reviewing the evidentiary findings of district court judges 
in terrorism cases. First, did the trial judge make a conscientious assessment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 FED. R. EVID. 403.  
203 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
204 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
205 See United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 160–62 (2d. Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 340–42 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated by Hammoud v. United States, 
543 U.S. 1097 (2005); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 122 (2d Cir. 1998). 
206 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 10A at 684 (TILLERS REV. 1983). 
207  See, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 511 (5th Cir. 2011). 
208 See, e.g., United States v. Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172, 180–85 (1997); El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 
507–08; Unites States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 131 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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before admitting or excluding evidence?209 Second, did the trial judge give 
limiting instructions aimed at mitigating the prejudicial impact of 
evidence?210 Third, was alternative, less prejudicial evidence available to 
prove the same point?211 Fourth, is there an indication that the jury engaged 
in a rational decision-making process?212 Fifth, did the jury selection process 
help to mitigate any potential prejudice that might arise from the 
evidence?213   
 
These factors are of varying utility in the terrorism context. Consider 
the last one. Every pre-trial selection process will raise the question of 
possible prejudice on voir dire, and lead to the seating of jurors who claim 
they are not prejudiced. Prejudice is easy to deny, and, often hard to detect. 
Moreover, there is a related risk that Arab-Americans and Muslim-
Americans will not be substantially represented in the jury pool.214 As for a 
rational decision-making process, we rarely know what went on in the secret 
deliberations, and knowing it might not make a difference once a verdict is 
in.215 This factor may come into play when the jury finds the defendant 
guilty on some counts and innocent on others.216 It is not helpful in a single 
count case or one, like Mehanna, in which the defendant is found guilty on all 
counts.  
 
On the other hand, it may be possible to determine whether the trial 
judge made a conscientious assessment of the evidence and its effect. An 
explanation of particular rulings would be an example.217 Hearing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 159-60; United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 
2006); Salameh, 152 F.3d at 111. 
210 Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 133; Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 161–62; Awadallah, 436 F.3d at 134. 
211 Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182–84; Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 160–61; Awadallah, 436 F.3d at 
132. Stipulation plays a role in the provision of alternative evidence, but its role varies from 
case to case. 
212 United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 310 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Chandia, 
514 F.3d 365, 375 (4th Cir. 2008). 
213 United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1114 (11th Cir. 2011); Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 
134. 
214 Peter Margulies, Guantanamo by Other Means: Conspiracy Prosecutions and Law Enforcement 
Dilemmas After September 11, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 513, 550 (2008). 
215 See Transcript of Disposition, supra note 26, at 12–13.  For example, the defense counsel 
informed Judge O’Toole that a juror would like to speak to him during the sentencing 
hearing; he refused to hear from the juror. 
216 See Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 310; Chandia, 514 F.3d at 375. 
217 See Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 159–60; Awadallah, 436 F.3d at 131; United States v. 
Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 111 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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argument before ruling on evidentiary questions would be another. One can 
also examine the instructions to see if the issue of prejudice was addressed. 
 
Beyond these general considerations, there are other evidentiary 
aspects of a case that can be examined after the fact. An example is the 
possibility that the evidence became cumulative. One formulation of this 
principle is that in any given trial there is necessarily a point at which the 
probative value of additional evidence aimed at proving the same point 
would be outweighed by the unfair prejudice of additional evidence.218 An 
alternative method of achieving the goals of the cumulative evidence rule is 
invocation of the cumulative error rule. Thus, individual instances of 
prejudicial error might be allowed to stand if, by themselves, their 
introduction would be harmless error, but, when taken as a whole, the 
introduction of improper evidence amounts to a violation of due process.219 
Overall, the appellate role may not seem heavy handed, but—apart from 
the trial judge’s acute knowledge of its presence—appellate courts will at 
times reverse a conviction if the record leads to the conclusion that certain 
conduct so infected the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process.220 
 
B. Terrorism Trials and Evidentiary Issues 
 
Professor Peter Margulies has pointed out the possibility of latent 
prejudice in terrorism trials, particularly the possibility of stereotyping at 
play before the proceeding even begins.221 Once the trial is underway, much 
of the evidence will, not surprisingly, involve terrorism. One can debate 
whether such evidence really creates new prejudices or even augments 
existing ones. It is not clear that, say, an email of the defendant praising 
Osama bin Laden, is going to affect the jury’s decision as to whether the 
defendant really was a “terrorist” of some sort. An ongoing stream of such 
emails might, however, have that effect. Thus, it seems correct to apply 
essentially the same rules concerning prejudicial evidence to terrorism-
related trials as is applied to litigation generally.222  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 See Wigmore, supra note 206, § 10a at 685.  
219 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 52; Taylor v. Kentucky 436 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1978); Al-
Moayad, 545 F.3d at 178. 
220 See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 340 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2002). 
221 Margulies, supra note 214, at 549–50. 
222 Placing terrorism-related cases in the general criminal justice system would seem to 
imply an acceptance of that system’s rules. Otherwise there is a danger of creating a subset 
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C. Terrorism Cases and Prejudicial Evidence 
 
The issue of prejudicial evidence has arisen in numerous terrorism-
related cases. In all but one instance, the defendant’s objections have not 
prevailed.223 Beyond the fact that appellate courts virtually always uphold 
the trial judge, it is hard to draw much general guidance from appellate 
opinions since they tend to be highly fact-specific.224 This subsection will 
first look briefly at cases in which prejudicial evidence charges were rejected. 
It will then consider United States v. Al-Moayad, in which prejudice was 
found.225  
 
In United States v. Rezaq,226 a small number of photos were admitted 
at trial, including one particularly graphic one. The District of Columbia 
Circuit declined to find “grave abuse” despite the possibility of prejudice.227 
Admission of photos of victims was also sustained in United States v. 
Salameh.228 There, the photos showed victims of the bombing with which the 
defendant was allegedly associated. The Second Circuit upheld the 
admission of the photos on the grounds that they were “probative of the 
nature and location of the explosion that killed the victims, which defendant 
disputed at trial.”229  Salameh raises questions as to the utility of stipulation as 
a means of providing “alternative evidence.”230 The defendant was willing 
to stipulate that the bombing caused injury and death. Citing Supreme 
Court precedent, however, the court stated that “a criminal defendant may 
not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as 
the government chooses to present it.”231 In United States v. Hammoud,232 
several Hezbollah videos were ruled admissible—including footage of 
crowds shouting “death to America”—in a case involving material support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the criminal justice system with harsher rules for one class of cases, and perhaps, an 
additional risk that those rules could, in turn, affect the broader system. 
223 See, e.g., Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 197.   
224 For example, it is hard to articulate a quantitative standard for prejudice. If one existed 
it would certainly be relevant to the Mehanna case.   
225 United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2008). 
226 United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
227 Id. at 1137. 
228 Salameh, 152 F.3d at 122. 
229 Id.  
230 Id. at 122–23. 
231 United States v. Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1997). 
232 United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th 2004). 
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to Hezbollah.233 On appeal, the trial judge’s ruling that the tapes were 
essential to proving motive was upheld.234 The Fourth Circuit viewed the 
case as straightforward because the defendant had put in issue his support 
for the violent activities of Hezbollah.235   
 
A more analogous case to Mehanna is United States v. Benkahla.236 On 
appeal of a false statement conviction, the defendant argued that admission 
of “several dozen videos, photographs, and documents (how many exactly is 
in dispute) went well beyond what was necessary to establish materiality and 
became a vehicle for placing irrelevant and prejudicial statements and 
events before the jury.”237 The Fourth Circuit’s opinion upholding 
admission is particularly significant because of its statement that the trial 
judge “could well conclude that lengthy testimony about various aspects of 
radical Islam was appropriate, and indeed necessary, for the jury to 
understand the evidence and determine the facts.”238 The defendant’s 
mindset surfaced again in United States v. El-Mezain.239 In a case that turned 
on whether charitable contributions ultimately went to Hamas, a range of 
evidence about Hamas’ violent activities was admitted. The Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the evidence “provided meaningful context and 
explanation.”240 It also expressed the following view that may serve as the 
closest thing we have to a general statement of the law in this area: “because 
this was a case about supporting terrorists, it is inescapable, we believe, that 
there would be some evidence about violence and terrorist activity.”241 
 
United States v. Al-Moayad appears to be the only terrorism case in 
which a defendant’s conviction was reversed on the ground of a violation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Id. at 340–41 (“The segments played by the Government included speeches by 
Hizballah leaders praising men who had martyred themselves and crowds shouting “Death 
to America” and “Death to Israel.”  Another tape depicted a group swearing to become 
martyrs “to shake the grounds under our enemies, America and Israel.” Most significantly, 
some of the tapes depicted Hizballah military operations and encouraged donations from 
those who could not participate directly in Hizballah operations.”).  
234 Id. at 342. 
235 Id. The court considered the photos probative of the defendant’s knowledge of 
Hezbollah’s nature and activities. 
236 United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008). 
237 Id. at 309. 
238 Id. at 310. 
239 United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011). 
240 Id. at 511. 
241 Id. 
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Rule 403.242 It involved allegations of material support violations243 in 
which the key event was a meeting between the defendants and an 
undercover agent at which the defendants agreed to receive money and 
return a portion to Hamas. The defendants alleged numerous Rule 403 
errors, including the admission of a picture of a bus bombing by Hamas, as 
well as a wedding speech by a Hamas official citing the bombing. The 
Second Circuit found this and other evidence to be excessively 
prejudicial.244 The court stated that:  
 
[T]he record reflects that the district court did consider the 
balance between [testimony about the bombing’s] 
probative value and possible prejudicial effect before 
allowing [the witness] to take the stand. However, we must 
conclude that, given the highly charged and emotional 
nature of the testimony and the minimal evidentiary value, 
the court’s decision was arbitrary.245 
   
The case is of uncertain precedential value.246 The evidence about Hamas 
was only one of several evidentiary rulings challenged on appeal.  The issue 
of willingness to stipulate brought into play the possibility of alternative 
methods of proof.247 The appellate court was clearly convinced that the trial 
judge had not made a conscientious assessment of the evidence. It even 
invoked the cumulative error doctrine in holding that due to the large 
number of incorrect rulings “the district court’s errors deprived the 
Defendants of a fair trial.”248 Although unstated, an appellate court’s overall 
appraisal of how the trial judge handled a terrorism case, inherently prone 
to prejudice, will often play a key role in its review of particular evidentiary 
rulings.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2008). 
243 The defendants were convicted of conspiring to provide material support to designated 
terrorist organizations Hamas and al-Qaeda, and attempting to provide material support to 
Hamas under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Supp. III 2009). Al-Moayad was also convicted of 
attempting to provide material support to al-Qaeda and providing material support to 
Hamas under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Supp. III 2009). 
244 See Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 172, 178.  
245 Id. at 160. 
246 See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 510–11 (distinguishing Al-Moayad on the facts); see also 
Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 21-8–10. 
247 See Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 160–61. 
248 See Id. at 159. 
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D. Mehanna as a Candidate for 403 Reversal – Judging the Judge 
 
Critics have focused on the First Amendment aspects of Mehanna 
while virtually ignoring the potentially serious claim of prejudice. One might 
expect civil libertarians to see in the latter a greater long-run danger to the 
value of a fair trial than application of the HLP test with its insistence on 
protecting independent advocacy.249 Indeed, while First Amendment issues 
surfaced frequently during the trial, far more attention was devoted to the 
admissibility of possibly prejudicial evidence under Rule 403, particularly 
during sometimes-lengthy exchanges between opposing counsel and the 
judge.250 The government spent an extraordinary amount of time offering 
various forms of evidence about jihad and the defendant’s ongoing interest 
in it. Despite expressing some concern about the need for redaction to 
“minimize unfair prejudice,”251 the judge ultimately admitted most of this 
material. Given the apparent thrust of the law—tilting toward admissibility, 
but suggesting that at some point the limits of Rule 403 can be reached—
how might these rulings hold up when the trial is reviewed on appeal? 
 
The Rule 403 challenge is the strongest argument for Mehanna. 
Although quantity by itself may not be a ground for reversal unless the 
cumulative evidence rule is triggered, the amount of potentially prejudicial 
evidence in Mehanna could serve to distinguish it from terrorism cases in 
which trial judges’ rulings have been upheld.252 Several of the factors that 
have been identified as indicating the possibility of prejudice are present. 
Judge O’Toole’s instructions did not place any particular emphasis on the 
problem of prejudicial evidence, although he did give a general admonition 
about the need for fairness and impartiality, and the need to avoid 
prejudice.253 The defense’s apparent willingness to stipulate on some issues 
might be seen as an alternative, less prejudicial method of proof.254 The 
jury’s unanimous verdict does not indicate differentiated considerations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 The outer boundaries of § 2339A also deserve consideration in mainstream—as opposed 
to academic—commentary, although they lack the sound bite quality of invocations of Mein 
Kampf. 
250 See Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 21-7, 21-11 (discussing, inter alia, the Al-
Moayad case and the defendant’s references to killing American soldiers as Texas BBQ). 
251 Id. at 21-10. 
252 See, e.g., United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 375 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
potentially prejudicial video was harmless because it took up only three minutes of time at 
trial). 
253 Transcript of Record, supra note 18, at 35-153. 
254 Id. at 10-61-62, 3-67-69. 
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the issues in the case. It may simply demonstrate that it thought Mehanna 
was guilty on all of the counts.  
 
On the other hand, Judge O’Toole did review proposed exhibits and 
other evidence beforehand, and indicated concern for the problem of 
prejudice.255 Perhaps most significant are the lengthy exchanges referred to 
above. These sidebar conferences—a form of mini-oral argument—even 
included a discussion of Al-Moayad.256 Additionally, when considering the 
question of cumulative evidence, the judge expressed the view that the sheer 
amount of it might be a point in the prosecution’s favor.257 It is hard to 
argue that his general handling of the evidence did not reflect a thorough 
appraisal of it,258 or that his handling of the overall trial did not reflect a 
conscientious effort at managing a complex and sensitive prosecution. 
 
Even if one concludes that an appellate court might let the matter 
rest, the amount of negative, stereotypical evidence introduced in Mehanna 
illustrates a key problem with preventive prosecutions: this tactic makes it 
easier for critics to say that Mehanna was really convicted for being a 
Muslim who held objectionable views.259 Let us assume that the legal system 
will see more of these prosecutions, and that like Mehanna’s, they will be 
highly public. The judge, who plays the role of “gatekeeper” in the judicial 
process,260 has a special responsibility to prevent latent prejudices from 
dominating the trial.  
 
IV. Sentencing Issues in Preventive Prosecutions 
 
 The sentencing decision is perhaps the most visible one that any 
judge makes in a trial. This is particularly true in terrorism trials that have 
the hallmarks of preventive prosecution.261 These cases are—and will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Id. at 27-13. 
256 Id. at 27-14, 21-10 (distinguishing Al-Moayad from Mehanna on the grounds that Mehanna 
involves a terrorism charge).  
257 Id. at 25-107 (“The very accumulation itself might itself have some probative value.”). 
258 Compare id. at 10-49–62, with United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 
2008) (holding that the trial judge acted arbitrarily in allowing clearly prejudicial evidence). 
259 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 87; see generally March, supra note 43 (arguing that the Mehanna 
case unconstitutionally criminalizes thoughts).  
260 See Margulies, supra note 214, at 553–54. One might also consider the role of prosecutors 
in controlling the amount of such evidence. Cf. id. at 552–53 (discussing the role of 
prosecutors in bringing cases of this nature).   
261 See infra Section VI.A.  
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continue to be—high profile and controversial by nature. Some people will 
feel that they never should have been brought.262 Others will demand a stiff 
sentence to punish the defendant’s conduct and to incapacitate him.263 The 
inherent difficulties faced by the judge are greatly increased by the 
extraordinary uncertainty in federal sentencing law, and the presence of a 
substantial “Terrorism Enhancement” in the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.264 
 
A. The Uncertain State of Federal Sentencing Law 
 
 The adoption of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 
“revolutionized federal sentencing.”265 Prior to the adoption federal judges 
had “largely uncontrolled discretion,” and there was no appellate review of 
sentencing decisions.266 The Guidelines were mainly a response to 
dissatisfaction with sentencing disparity. They were the product of extensive 
work by the United States Sentencing Commission, based on “the premise 
that treating similar offenses and similar offenders alike forms the basis of a 
just and rational sentencing policy.”267 The result of this work was an 
extremely complex set of Guidelines—binding on trial courts and subject to 
appellate review—that attempted to reconcile the irreconcilable by first 
creating a numerical system for mechanically computing sentences and then 
permitting a number of adjustments that would “individualize” the 
sentence.268  
 
 However, in the 2005 case of United States v. Booker, the Supreme 
Court, by a majority of five to four, held the Guidelines system 
unconstitutional.269 The Court found a violation of the Sixth Amendment in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Sahar Aziz, Tarek Mehanna: Punishing Muslims for Free Speech Only Helps al’ Qaeda, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 19, 2012, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0419/Tarek-Mehanna-
Punishing-Muslims-for-free-speech-only-helps-Al-Qaeda. 
263 Chesney, supra note 6, at 425. 
264 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.4 (2009) (“If the offense is a felony that 
involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels; 
but if the resulting offense level is less than level 32, increase to level 32 . . . In each such 
case, the defendant's criminal history category from Chapter Four (Criminal History and 
Criminal Livelihood) shall be Category VI.”). 
265 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 22, at 838. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 842. 
268 Id. at 843. 
269 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).    
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the fact that the Guidelines sentence could rest, in part, on facts found by a 
judge using the preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than a jury 
governed by reasonable doubt.270 A different majority held that this did not 
render the Guidelines null and void.271 This second majority determined 
that the best way to preserve the intent of Congress as expressed in the 1984 
Sentencing Act was to keep the Guidelines in place but to treat them as 
advisory.272 Separately, this majority made it clear that trial courts were to 
give substantial consideration to the goals of the act expressed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)—imposing sentences that “reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate 
deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the defendant with 
needed educational and vocational training and medical care.”273 
 
 Not surprisingly, chaos ensued at both the trial and appellate levels. 
Some judges took the view that sticking as closely to the Guidelines as 
possible would enhance goals of uniformity and fairness.274 Others took a 
more nuanced approach, leading to the creation of a form of “common law 
of sentencing.”275 The holding(s) in Booker also created uncertainty about the 
respective roles of appellate and trial courts. Appellate review remained in 
place,276 yet trial courts now possessed greater discretion than they had 
when the Guidelines were mandatory. Writing for the remedial majority, 
Justice Breyer stated, “[w]ithout the ‘mandatory’ provision, the act 
nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with 
other sentencing goals.”277 This indicates appellate judges would have 
something to review, and a potentially significant role. Yet Justice Breyer 
went on to state that the sentencing factors as well as past practice “imply a 
practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts: review for 
‘unreasonable[ness].’”278 
 
 Two years after Booker the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
appellate review, and came down firmly on the side of district court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Id. 
271 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., Dissenting). 
272 Id.  
273 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); Booker, 543 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., Dissenting). 
274 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 22, at 873. 
275 See generally id. at 870–73. 
276 Booker, 543 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., Dissenting).    
277 Id. at 259. 
278 Id. at 261; see also ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 22, at 889. 
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discretion. In Kimbrough v. United States279 the trial judge expressed 
disagreement with the Guidelines’ formula for calculating a sentence for the 
possession of crack cocaine280 and sentenced the defendant to a lower range 
than the Guidelines suggested. The Second Circuit vacated the sentence on 
the ground that a sentence outside the Guidelines range is per se281 
unreasonable when based on a disagreement with the Guidelines’ approach 
to a particular issue. The Supreme Court reversed,282 noting the Guidelines’ 
now-advisory status, and also repeated the importance of broader § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors.283 Indeed, the Court seemed to be suggesting that 
§ 3553(a) should now be the lodestar for trial courts. The companion 
decision in Gall v. United States284 elaborated on the procedure that district 
court judges must follow to ensure that a sentence is not reversed, even if the 
appellate court would have reached a different result.285 The judge must 
begin by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. Then, after 
hearing argument from both sides, the judge must consider the § 3553(a) 
factors. The judge may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable, 
but rather, must engage in an individualized assessment of the defendant’s 
offense. Any non-Guidelines sentence requires justification. Meaningful 
appellate review may come next, but judges who follow the procedure will 
survive it. In Gall itself, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s vacation of a 
sentence. The circuit court had held that a variance from the Guidelines 
must be supported by extraordinary circumstances.286 The net result of the 
2007 cases is to emphasize the nonbinding status of the Guidelines (even 
though trial judges must start with them), and to vest substantial sentencing 
discretion in trial judges—as long as they follow the proper steps and can 
ground their decisions in § 3553(a). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
280 Id. at 91. 
281 United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App'x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006) rev'd and remanded in 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
282 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91. 
283 Id. 
284 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
285 Id. at 51. 
286 Id. at 49 (“Most importantly, both the exceptional circumstances requirement and the 
rigid mathematical formulation reflect a practice—common among courts that have 
adopted ‘proportional review’—of applying a heightened standard of review to sentences 
outside the Guidelines range. This is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions—whether inside or 
outside the Guidelines range.”).  
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B. Sentencing in Terrorism-Related cases and the Shadow of the Terrorism 
Enhancement 
 
 An examination of recent terrorism cases suggests that appellate 
courts continue to scrutinize terrorism sentences carefully, and are even 
willing to increase sentences imposed after trial. For example, in United States 
v. Jayyousi,287 the Eleventh Circuit invoked Gall, which it read as involving a 
two-step process.288 The “first step,” which the court labeled as mechanical, 
included most of what the Supreme Court seemed to require in Gall.289 The 
second step was described as “concerning the substantive reasonableness of 
the sentence.”290 This rather probing review went beyond the procedural 
requirements and led to the conclusion that one of the defendants’ sentences 
should be vacated and adjusted upward on remand.291  
 
 Other courts of appeals have required adjustment, including upward 
adjustment.292 One typical basis for reversal is when the trial court 
compares the defendant’s case to other terrorism cases and imposes a 
similar sentence. If the appellate court finds that specific comparisons were 
utilized, but that the cases were not in fact similar, it will often vacate the 
sentence. In United States v. Abu Ali, the court vacated a downward deviation 
from the Guidelines sentence.293 It found that the defendant’s plans for 
terrorism on a massive and significant scale, even though not carried out, 
rendered inappropriate a comparison with cases such as those of John 
Walker Lindh,294 Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols, despite the fact 
that those defendants had carried out their plans.295 General 
unreasonableness and inapt comparisons play a major role in appellate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 United States v. Jayyousi, 637 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011).  
288 Id. at 1116. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 1119. 
291 Id. at 1117–19. 
292 See, e.g., United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Abu 
Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008). 
293 Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 269. For other courts also vacating downward deviations, see also 
Ressam, 679 F.3d at 1094; Jayoussi, 637 F.3d at 1117–18. 
294 Id. at 259. 
295 Id. at 264–65. The court found that Abu-Ali’s case was not similar to the McVeigh and 
Nichols cases because his threats to assassinate the President and his plans to kill American 
civilians would have caused extraordinary harm. The court reasoned that requiring a 
completed act before giving out large sentences would impose too high a standard for 
giving lengthy sentences. Id. 
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review of terrorism-related sentences. However, hanging over all these cases 
is the shadow of the Guidelines’ “Terrorism Enhancement.” 
 
 The Enhancement was added by the Commission in 1994 at the 
direction of Congress.296 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
provides that “[i]f the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to 
promote, a federal crime of terrorism [the punishment is increased].”297 The 
“Application Notes” define a “federal crime of terrorism” by reference to 18 
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5),298 which, in turn, provides a two-part definition: first, 
the crime must be “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct,”299 and second, the offense must be one of a list of crimes often, 
but not necessarily, connected to terrorism.300 The result of application of 
the Enhancement is quite severe. In the technical terms of the Guidelines it 
increases the “offense level” by 12 and the “criminal history” category to 
VI, the highest possible category.301 In practical terms it is likely to mean life 
imprisonment.  
 
 The Enhancement is controversial. One critic has described it as 
“draconian,”302 stretching “far beyond its roots in international terrorism, 
giving it far-reaching power, and leading to devastating consequences.”303 
The principal contention is that the Enhancement leads to disproportionate 
sentences by treating a wide range of crimes alike.304 It can be seen as 
reflecting a monolithic perception of terrorism, rather than a nuanced 
perception of different crimes and differences of severity within a punishable 
crime. On the other hand, it has been defended on precisely this ground: 
terrorism is terrorism, regardless of the form it takes; it is a unique form of 
crime that requires unique treatment. The remarks of Judge Walker on a 
particular sentencing decision give a good sense of this position: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 172 (2d. Cir. 2009) (Walker, J., Dissenting). 
297 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.4 (Supp. III 2009). 
298 Application Notes for U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.4 (2009). 
299 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006). 
300 Id. The list performs a similar function to the enumeration of crimes in § 2339A.   
301 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 22, at 842–46 (describing the operation of these two 
aspects of the Guidelines). The minimum offense level is also automatically increased to 32. 
See supra note 264. However, many terrorism offenses will already be close to this level.  
302 James P. McLaughlin, Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4: 
Sentencing Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 28 L. & INEQ. 51, 
51 (2010). 
303 Id. at 52. 
304 Id. at 58. 
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Congress and the Sentencing Commission plainly intended 
for the punishment of crimes of terrorism to be significantly 
enhanced without regard to whether, due to events beyond 
the defendant’s control, the defendant’s conduct failed to 
achieve its intended deadly consequences. Such intent is 
plain from the many criminal statutes and Guidelines 
unrelated to terrorism that specifically account for the level 
or absence of injury, while the material support statute and 
Terrorism Enhancement do not.305  
 
According to Judge Walker, “Courts routinely, and unflinchingly apply the 
Terrorism Enhancement in the absence of proven harm.”306 Nonetheless, 
an interesting controversy has arisen as to whether the defendant must be 
found to have committed one of the enhancement-triggering crimes and to 
have done so in a way “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct.”307 A plain reading of the Application Note’s reference to § 
2332b(g)(5) certainly says as much, which thus implies that the sentencing 
court must make two separate findings: one regarding the actus reus and the 
other regarding the mens rea. In practice, however, courts have differed over 
whether these two findings may be collapsed into one on the ground that 
the actus reus—that is, the commission of one the underlying felonies—is all 
that is required because such offenses will affect the “conduct of 
government” by definition.308 Consequently, interpreting the applicability of 
§ 2332b(g)(5) may present a more typical question of legal interpretation 
than most sentencing questions. However, as with the admission of 
evidence, the sentencing judge is captain of the ship. The likelihood of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 175 (2d. Cir. 2009) (Walker, J., Dissenting).  
306 See Id. at 176.  But see, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(applying the Terrorism Enhancement to a case in which the defendants raised money for 
Hamas); United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying the 
Enhancement in a case in which the defendant claimed he was merely giving aid to 
suppressed Muslims).  
307 Stewart, 590 F.3d at 137–38. 
308 Compare United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 262 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
Terrorism Enhancement is applicable because the defendant’s acts necessarily 
encompassed the requisite intent), with United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 375 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that the Terrorism Enhancement is inapplicable when there has not 
been a factual finding of the requisite intent).  
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deferential appellate review strengthens this position, especially in the post-
Kimbrough/Gall era. 
 
C. Mehanna’s Sentence and the Judge’s Methodology 
 
 Judge O’Toole faced highly conflicting arguments when ruling on 
Mehanna’s sentence. The defense recommended a sentence of 63 to 78 
months.309 The prosecution recommended 25 years.310 The court’s 
probation office—the agency charged with applying the Guidelines to 
individual cases and advising judges on the appropriate sentence—
recommended life.311 To identify the proper sentence in light of such 
disparate views, Judge O’Toole’s methodology involved the complex, three-
step procedure laid down in Gall. 
 
 Judge O’Toole first calculated the Guidelines sentence by identifying 
the base offense level. He then considered whether to make upward or 
downward adjustments to reflect the presence of any aggravating or 
mitigating factors, such as the defendant’s role in the offense(s),312 and 
concluded that only upward adjustments were warranted.313 He then 
applied the first half of the Terrorism Enhancement—the 12 level increase 
in the base offense—but refused to apply the criminal history increase, 
which he referred to as “off the charts.”314 Under this analysis, the 
Guidelines sentence was life in prison, but Judge O’Toole emphasized from 
the outset that he would not impose such a sentence.315 
 
 He next heard from the parties, each of whom emphasized the high 
profile nature of the case316 as well as 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).317 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Defendant’s Memorandum on Appropriate Sentence Under the Sentencing Guidelines 
at 3, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011). 
310 Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 13, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-
10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011). 
311 Id. at 11–12. 
312 Transcript of Disposition, supra note 26, at 8–12.  
313 See id. at 10 (upward adjustment for obstruction of justice); id. at 9–10 (declining to make 
a downward adjustment for a minor role). 
314 Id. at 9–12. The Enhancement would have given Mehanna the highest possible criminal 
history level despite the fact that he had no criminal history prior to his arrest, a fact that 
would have resulted in a life sentence when combined with the Enhancement’s prescribed 
increase in offense level. Ultimately, Judge O’Toole refused to apply either aspect of the 
Enhancement. See supra text accompanying note 302.    
315 Transcript of Disposition, supra at note 26, at 11–12. 
316 See, e.g., id. at 22, 44–45. 
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government in this situation had perhaps the easier task, since it could build 
on the guilty verdict. Thus, the prosecution invoked factors such as 
protecting the public.318 The defense emphasized issues of speech,319 and 
referenced a number of cases with low sentences for conduct arguably more 
serious than the defendant’s.320 The defendant then gave a dramatic 
presentation of his views,321 in which he emphasized the need for Muslims 
to defend other Muslims under attack.322 This remarkable—at times 
defiant—speech, was hardly a plea for leniency. 
 
 The proceedings then entered a third phase in which the judge 
viewed the primary source of guidance as § 3553(a), not the Guidelines.323 
He emphasized both “the nature and circumstances of the offense” and “the 
need to provide for just punishment of like offenses.”324 Moreover, Judge 
O’Toole went out of his way to express the view that Mehanna’s “speech” 
activities were more than independent advocacy,325 stating that “the jury 
has answered that question,” and that “to think otherwise one would have 
to disregard a good deal of the trial evidence.”326 Finally, like the 
prosecution, he noted that one “object of criminal prosecution is simply to 
incapacitate a defendant from committing another offense by reason of 
incarceration.”327 This object is reflected in § 3553(a).328 
 
 Judge O’Toole next engaged in an in-depth criticism of the 
Terrorism Enhancement.329 He viewed the automatic adjustment of the 
offense level in any “terrorism” case as arbitrary because it applied without 
regard to the facts of a particular case.330 He argued this was “contrary to 
and subversive of the mission of the Guidelines which is to address with 
some particularity the facts of each case.”331 Judge O’Toole reserved his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Id. at 13–47. 
318 See id. at 31. 
319 Id. at 43–44. 
320 Id. at 43. 
321 Id. at 47–59. 
322 Id. at 56–57. 
323 Id. at 61–75. 
324 Id. at 61 (quoting § 3553(a)). 
325 Id. 62–64.  
326 Id. at 64. 
327 Id. at 66. 
328 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).  
329 Transcript of Disposition, supra note 26, at 69–70. 
330 See id. at 69. 
331 Id. 
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harshest criticism for the automatic increase in the defendant’s criminal 
history category to the highest one, dismissing it as a “fiction.”332 Mehanna, 
for example, had no criminal history. Judge O’Toole ultimately concluded 
that application of the Guidelines without the Enhancement would yield a 
suggested range of 168 to 210 months and that the § 3553(c) factors pointed 
toward a sentence at the upper end of the range.333 In the end, he arrived at 
a form of “non-Guidelines guidelines” sentence of 210 months,334 with 
seven years of supervised release.335 
 
 Judge O’Toole played a more forceful role in sentencing than in any 
other aspect of the trial. To some extent this posture is inevitable, given the 
post-Booker role of federal judges in sentencing. An open question is whether 
his sentencing methodology will hold up if challenged on appeal. The 
government lodged an objection immediately after the sentence was handed 
down.336 The defense will presumably appeal the sentence as well. But if the 
First Circuit reverses the convictions, it might not reach the sentencing 
issue. Assuming the issue is contested, the government would seem to have 
the stronger set of arguments.337 
 
 First, the government could argue that the judge engaged in an 
improper comparison of Mehanna with other terrorism cases.338 Appellate 
courts have reversed trial court sentencing decisions based on the use of 
such comparisons.339 However, the reversals seem mainly to have been 
based on improper comparisons to cases that differed in one or more 
significant factual ways from the case under review.340 Judge O’Toole 
sought uniformity by utilizing a comparison of a sample of cases that were 
similar in terms of the offense charged.341 The “sample” was admittedly 
small, but the use of the comparison may survive. As Judge O’Toole 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Id. He also viewed it as “fundamentally at odds with the design of the Guidelines.” Id. 
333 See id. at 70–73. 
334 Id.  
335 Id. at 74. 
336 Id. at 75–76. 
337 The defense would hardly support the Terrorism Enhancement, and would have an 
uphill fight, after Gall and Kimbrough, in challenging a sentence that appears to have 
followed those cases and is less than the prosecution recommended. See discussion supra Part 
IV.A. 
338 See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 310, at 12; Transcript of 
Disposition, supra note 26, at 26–27. 
339 See, e.g., United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012). 
340 See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 262 (4th Cir. 2008). 
341 Transcript of Disposition, supra note 26, at 70–72. 
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implied, his field comparison seems in line with the search for uniformity 
that the Guidelines reflect.342 However, there is room for disagreement over 
whether being charged with the broad crimes of “providing material 
support” under two distinct statutes makes defendants similar. This 
disagreement reflects the broader tension between the Guidelines’ search for 
uniformity and the goal of individualized sentencing. 
 
 Additionally, the government could argue that Judge O’Toole erred 
by dismissing the Enhancement. The issue here is not whether the judge 
added the Enhancement at the wrong step when calculating the Guidelines 
sentencing, but rather, whether he was correct in dismissing the applicability 
of the Enhancement in its entirety. Indeed, it would exalt form over 
substance to place the emphasis on when Judge O’Toole threw out the 
Enhancement. The Enhancement, although not a statute, was created at the 
express direction of Congress.343 However, like the Guidelines, it was 
actually promulgated by the Commission, and does not have the binding 
force of a statute. While the Supreme Court has never ruled on the 
Enhancement, lower courts differ.344 Furthermore, it is hard to argue with 
Judge O’Toole’s point that assigning the highest possible criminal history to 
a defendant with no criminal history does not accord with the broader goals 
of sentencing as illustrated by the Guidelines.345 Although apparently 
ignored by the press and critics, this aspect of Mehanna may turn out to be 
the most controversial. Judge O’Toole thus made a significant contribution 
to the debate about the role of the criminal justice system in terrorism 
prosecutions, especially preventive ones. The Enhancement is based on a 
one-size-fits-all approach that may not be sensitive to the differentiation 
among “terrorists” that Mehanna brings to the fore. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Id. at 73. 
343 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 172 (2d. Cir. 2009) (Walker, J., Dissenting). 
344 See Defendant’s Memorandum on Appropriate Sentence under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, supra note 310, at 11–13 (discussing both the general concept of downward 
departures based on criminal history and examples of disagreement with the 
Enhancement’s use of criminal history category VI). Compare Stewart, 590 F.3d at 153–57 
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing that it was within district court’s discretion to consider 
“atypical” nature of defendant’s crime and lack of evidence of harm in arriving at an 
individualized sentence where Guideline recommendation was controlled by broad 
Enhancement), with id. at 175–79 (Walker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that the “atypical” nature of the defendant’s crime and lack of evidence of harm 
did not justify the district court’s elimination of the Enhancement).  
345 Transcript of Disposition, supra note 26, at 69. 
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V. The Central Role of the Judge 
 
 Much of this Article has dealt with the actions of Federal District 
Court Judge George O’Toole during the Mehanna trial. This subsection 
builds on those actions in formulating a broad outline of the role of the 
judge in preventive prosecutions.   
 
A. The Sentence 
 
The analysis begins at the end, at the trial level, at least: the 
imposition of sentence. It is one of the most high profile moments in a high 
profile event, rivaled only by the verdict. That belongs to the jury, but the 
judge, particularly in the post-Gall-Kimbrough era, controls the sentence.346 A 
judge can hide behind the Guidelines, or decide the matter largely on his 
own. Preventive prosecutions, no matter how close they come to 
incapacitative, trigger the Terrorism Enhancement.347 In rejecting the 
Enhancement, Judge O’Toole also rejected one possible philosophy on 
terrorism: that it represents an essentially monolithic entity that must always 
be treated with the utmost severity. This approach seems close to the 
premise underlying preventive prosecutions: that at any time and in any 
form terrorism must be stopped. The logic of this position leads not only to 
the Enhancement, but can go so far as to suggest that a failed prosecution 
may still have value if it incapacitates.348 
 
Rejection of this view seems to represent an important value of the 
criminal law: the gradation of offenses. We do not treat a purse-snatcher like 
a rapist. The Enhancement reflects a different view: a terrorist is a terrorist. 
Yet it should not be forgotten that Judge O’Toole sentenced Mehanna to 17 
and one half years with supervised release. This outcome suggests that the 
system can differentiate among terrorists generally, as well as among those 
whose actions fall on different points of the prevention spectrum. Perhaps it 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107–10 (2007). 
347 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2009). 
348 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 486 (discussing use of § 2339A “as a means to incapacitate 
suspects.”). 
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B. Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Less dramatic, but crucial, especially if viewed cumulatively, are a 
judge’s rulings on what evidence the government can introduce. Particularly 
as we move toward the incapacitation end of the spectrum, these rulings will 
guide the extent to which the government can rely on evidence about the 
person. No prosecution will reach the point where there is no alleged crime, 
thus forcing the government to rely on evidence about the person alone. 
However, the less apparent it is that a case involves even the prevention of 
an act of terrorism, the more the jury will look to the judge as a guide. 
Guidance can be explicit—in the form of instructions—or implicit—in the 
form of rulings. Judge O’Toole went quite far in admitting evidence about 
Mehanna the person for purposes of “context” and “state of mind.” These 
rulings can be seen as support for those who want to emphasize the nature 
of the defendant—the “terrorist wannabe”349—as long as the government 
can adduce some arguable crime. Certainly, such rulings emphasize the 
power of the judge to shape the jury’s perception of the defendant and how 
the trial should resolve his fate. 
 
C. Doctrinal Issues 
 
Finally, there is the question of how the judge handles uncertain 
doctrinal issues—both in his evidentiary rulings and in his instructions. 
Mehanna presented a number of uncertainties, such as how much interaction 
with a terrorist organization is needed to satisfy HLP. Another is whether 
§ 2339A should really be applied as loosely as it seems to be, so that any 
amorphous crime, somewhere down the road, satisfies the requirement of a 
link to the defendant’s conduct and thus the statute’s apparent mens rea 
requirement. Judge O’Toole appeared to treat these as matters of settled 
law in his instructions. The fact that he let in a lot of evidence on what 
Mehanna did and said has the virtue of leaving appellate courts with room 
to maneuver if there is to be a change or amplification of the applicable law. 
A trial judge might be more aggressive in framing the issues, for example, in 
explaining to the jury the possible meanings of “coordination” in a § 2339B 
count. However, he probably thought that the jury could work with what 
the Supreme Court gave them, and that any refinement would come from a 
higher court anyway. He denied the defense’s request for an instruction that 
would, in effect, have ruled out one-way “coordination,” perhaps leaving 
some latitude in defining that term. Such an approach certainly does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 See Wittes, supra note 153. 
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hurt the preventive paradigm, as the result in Mehanna bears out. Assuming 
no major change on appeal, prosecutors who favor that paradigm can work 
effectively within existing law until and unless some court restricts it.348 The 
Federal District Court for Massachusetts was not that court. 
 
It is not the intention of this Article to criticize Judge O’Toole. He 
kept tight control over a contentious 35-day trial, during which emotions 
frequently reached the boiling point.350 His sentence displeased the 
government; his evidentiary rulings displeased the defense. His doctrinal 
approach took the law as he found it, leaving any changes to higher courts. 
His overall handling of the trial seems to have led to a victory for those who 
espouse aggressive use of the preventive approach. Nothing in it stops them. 




 Mehanna is an important case. In a prosecution based largely on 
statutes forbidding provision of “material support” to terrorists and 
terrorism-related crimes, the defendant was found guilty. The trial put to 
the test principles of preventive prosecution as well as the ability of the 
government to prosecute terrorism-related speech in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP). A close 
examination of the trial yields valuable insights on both issues as well as 
broader questions raised by the “war on terror” and the use of the criminal 
justice system to fight it. This examination leads to the conclusion that in a 
trial like Mehanna’s, three facets assume critical importance: (1) the judge’s 
approach to application of the HLP test; (2) the judge’s rulings about how 
much evidence concerning the defendant as a jihadist sympathizer should 
be admitted; and, (3) if conviction results, the judge’s approach to 
sentencing in a terrorism case. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 See Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention Debate, in 
Symposium: Law, Ethics, and the War on Terror, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669,674–675, 679 
(2009) (emphasizing capacity of current federal criminal law to permit preventive 
prosecutions). 
350 See, e.g., Transcript of Disposition, supra note 26, at 60 (accusation by the defendant that 
the prosecutor was a “liar”). 
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 With respect to the first, the judge in Mehanna took a cautious 
approach, essentially restating what appears to be existing law. However, 
with respect to the HLP test on criminalizing speech, the judge may have 
left the door open for a broad interpretation of when a defendant’s speech is 
sufficiently linked to a terrorist organization that it can be criminalized. As 
for evidentiary rulings, the judge permitted the introduction of a large 
amount of potentially inflammatory evidence, apparently accepting the 
prosecution’s view that the value of establishing “context” and “state of 
mind” outweighed the risk of prejudice. As for sentencing, the judge took a 
middle ground approach, imposing a substantial sentence, but refusing to 
apply the Sentencing Guidelines’ “Terrorism Enhancement.” His 
sentencing decision can be seen not only as a rejection of a rigid approach 
to terrorism-related crimes, but also as acceptance of a nuanced approach 
which contains room for the concept of prevention. 
 
 Overall, a close look at the trial demonstrates the central role that 
the judge will play in any preventive prosecution. As the defendant’s 
conduct shifts away from actual acts of terrorism and specific preparations 
for them, the jury will look to the judge for guidance. In Mehanna, the judge 
conducted the trial with a firm hand, but in a manner—and with a result—
that leaves room for the controversial notion of preventive prosecution.  
 
 
